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Over the last decade many European countries have increased both the scope and 
content of national party regulation. This trend is mirrored by an ever-increasing 
interest within European governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
guide this process and to determine the direction as regards its content. Little 
systematic scholarly attention has been paid to this supranational dimension, 
however. First of all, this working paper focuses on the identification of European 
normative conceptions of the role of political parties in modern democracies 
through an analysis of the rise of European standards regarding political party 
legislation. Secondly, it analyzes the (direct or indirect) impact on the national 
parties and party systems of the legislation adopted at the European level to 
determine whether these new norms matter. Towards these ends, this paper 
analyzes the regulation of political parties by supranational European 
organizations, concentrating in particular on the regulations, guidelines and 
recommendations adopted by the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and 
the European Court of Human Rights.  
Introduction 
In recent years the regulation of parties, party behavior and party organization 
has become somewhat of a trend in many European countries. Deliberation on 
the outlook of party regulation does not form an isolated process that occurs 
solely at the state level. Instead a wide array of international governmental and 
non-governmental organizations has come to display its thoughts on the 
preferred shape of party regulation. Over the last decade the European Court of 
Human Rights transformed itself into a beacon of hope for national parties that 
have come to fear for their existence. The Council of Europe’s European 
Commission for Democracy through Law is frequently invited to offer opinions 
on the conformity of national party law with international standards. Party 
assistance providers support party development through the active promotion of 
specific forms of party legislation. 
Several common threads, such as the need to regulate party funding, run 
through the instruments applied by these institutions. However, it is unclear 
which standards regarding political party regulation the international European 
institutions apply precisely. Furthermore, little is known on whether these 
bodies have an influence on national institutions. If international institutions 
effectively propagate certain standards of party regulation, these element need 
to be taken into account when attempting to grasp the complete picture of 
                                                        
1 This research was made possible by a grant from the European Research Council 
(ERC_Stg07_205660), whose support is gratefully acknowledged. 
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political party regulation. In order to answer question of whether European 
standards regarding political party legislation affect national institutions, this 
working paper identifies the standards for party law that the European 
institutions promote and subsequently determines whether the implementation 
of these standards in institutional policy is of effect on national institutions.   
 Within academic literature on Europeanization, or the effect of European 
integration on the national political structure and process, the consensus has 
emerged that Europe matters. However, it is unclear to what extent and in which 
ways it matters (Börzel & Risse, 2003). Very little has been written on the 
influence of European standards on national party law and political parties, one 
exception being Walecki’s analysis (2007) of the influence of Europe on party 
funding legislation in Eastern Europe. Through its focus on the influence of a 
European standards regarding party legislation on national institutions, this 
working paper aims to contribute to the debate on how Europe matters by filling 
in a gap in academic literature regarding European standards and national party 
law. 
 The following section of the paper provides a theoretical overview of the 
literature on parties and party regulation, the neo-institutional concept of norm 
creation, and the influence of Europe on national norms and policies. This is 
followed by an analysis of the standards for behavior that are emerging at the 
European level and by a section that analyses the influence of European 
institutions on national institutions such as parties and national party law.  
Political parties and democracy 
One normative perspective regarding political parties that has remained 
relatively unchallenged over the last fifty years is the one presented by 
Schattschneider (1942:1), according to which “[m]odern democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of political parties”. It has become common academic 
practice to take this assumption as a premise and subsequently focus on the 
specific manifestations of political parties and the implications that these 
manifestations have for democracy. The focus on the relationship between 
parties and civil society is a second perspective that long determined the 
characterization of political parties within party research. This relationship 
forms the base of Duverger’s (1954) distinction between the ‘mass party’ and 
‘elite-based party’ and Kirchheimer’s (1966) ‘catch-all party’. The ‘mass party’ 
model came to be seen as an ideal-typical model for parties (Katz & Mair, 1995). 
However, one problem with this model is that it fails to take into account 
the relationship between parties and the state. Katz & Mair (1995) argue that the 
weakening of ties between civil society and political parties is accompanied by 
“an anchoring of parties within the state” (p.15). This goes hand in hand with a 
normative shift from socialist and pluralist definitions of democracy to 
democracy as a service in the form of contested elections provided by the state 
for civil society. In the process, the state transforms into a support structure for 
the existing ‘cartel parties’ (p.15). With increasing state support comes 
increasing state involvement in political parties, thereby transforming them from 
private organizations into public utilities (van Biezen, 2004). Hence, most 
European countries have created specific party law within public law to regulate 
party activities and party behaviour as opposed to other types of private 
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organizations. Because parties are valued guarantors of democracy, the common 
norm has emerged that they should both be supported and regulated to ensure 
that they (continue to) effectively provide a democratic service (van Biezen, 
2008). Current public disengagement with political parties contributes to the 
fortification of this normative public role of parties. Concern with this 
disengagement has created an interest in the intellectual world in constitutional 
democracy as opposed to popular democracy. “[T]he benefits of transparency, 
legality and the provision of access to stakeholders are held up against the limits 
and distortions induced by partisan politics, and are seen to lead to a process 
which can offer “a fair and democratic substitute for electoral accountability”” 
(Mair, 2005: p.6). Society thus experiences an increasing stimulus to regulate 
political parties. This stimulus is the result of the growing integration of parties 
within the state and the weakening ties between parties and civil society.  
 National political parties are not only subject to triggers of change at the 
domestic level but at the European level as well. This is mirrored by the fact that 
the influence of increasing European integration on national politics has become 
a popular research theme over the last decade. Authors have focused on aspects 
such as the influence of Europe on domestic policies (Featherstone, 2003), 
national party systems (Mair, 2000), and power distribution and organization 
within individual political parties (Poguntke et al., 2007). Although a direct 
influence of Europe on national party systems has not been identified (Mair, 
2000), parties do respond to challenges to their functioning created through 
altering environments, which in turn is the effect of increasing European 
integration (Ladrech, 2002). Although a Europe-wide trend is visible in the 
creation of national party law, the interaction between national party law and 
European integration is as of yet largely uncovered territory (but see Walecki, 
2007). Given the fact that the functioning of political parties is increasingly 
shaped through national party law (van Biezen, 2008), this working paper 
addresses the question whether European standards regarding political party 
legislation affects national institutions? The answer to this question comes in two 
parts. The first section of the paper focuses on four different European 
institutions to determine whether European standards regarding political party 
legislation are indeed emerging. These institutions are: 1) the Council of Europe 
(CoE), 2) the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 3) party aid provides, 
and 4) the European Parliament. The second part of this paper determines 
whether these European standards are of influence on national institutions. 
 
European standards regarding political party legislation 
Although political parties are national institutions that largely developed 
externally to the constitutional and legal order in most European countries 
(Aldrich, 2006), over time virtually every country developed national party law 
(van Biezen, 2008). Party law is the general denominator for the legislative work 
on political parties embodied in the constitution, political party laws, political 
finance, electoral and campaign laws, and related “legislative statutes, 
administrative rulings and court decisions” (van Biezen, 2008: p.342). Party law 
regulates parties and party activities either by: 1) entirely proscribing them 
through their prohibition; 2) permitting them to operate freely; 3) promoting 
them through active support; 4) protecting or favouring them over others; or 5) 
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prescribing certain types of behaviour for them (Janda, 2005). Parties and party 
activities are not the only focus of party law, however.  When looking at party 
regulation, one should keep in mind that party regulation is always a means to 
support a higher normative goal. This goal can be deduced from the “empirical 
assumptions and implicit normative positions” (Persily and Cain, 2000: p.779) 
that form the base for the legal regulation of politics and political parties. The 
higher normative goals come in many forms, such as democracy or the status 
quo embedded within the (non-)party system (van Biezen, 2008; Karvonen, 
2007). 
 The European standards regarding political party legislation are 
determined through an analysis of both these normative and regulatory 
elements. The way in which the European institutions aim to prescribe and 
proscribe party behavior, thereby permitting and inhibiting the effective 
functioning of parties provides information about the regulatory elements that 
the European institutions apply. The ills that the proposed changes in party law 
should address provide information on the higher normative goals that the 
European institutions aim to achieve in the process. Together these elements 
form an outline of the European standards regarding political party legislation. 
This paper focuses on international standards regarding party legislation on 
three thematic dimensions (Karvonen, 2007): 1) conditions for and restrictions 
of political parties; 2) political party financing; 3) internal party organization. 
Party legislation on these dimensions has been identified in most European 
countries (Karvoonen, 2007; van Biezen, 2008). It therefore seems likely that the 
European institutions will address these three themes as well.   
 
Influence of standards on national institutions 
This paper’s focus on the influence of standards held by European institutions on 
national institutions implies an institutional premise, namely the assumption 
that institutions play a significant role in determining political outcomes. The 
way in which institutions perform this role is subject to an ongoing academic 
debate. Hall and Taylor (1996) discern three broad theoretical strands within 
new institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalists apply a path-
dependent approach in which institutional variations explain for variations in 
outcomes. Rational choice institutionalism is characterized by its calculus 
approach. Actors use rational calculations as an instrument to determine the 
consequences of their actions. Institutions shape reality and are hence of 
influence on the actors’ preferences for action. Sociological institutionalism 
applies a cultural approach in which actors follow norms and conventions, which 
are diffused through organizational fields or across nations. The European 
standards regarding political party legislation that are the focal point of this 
paper closely resemble the concept ‘norms’ present in sociological 
institutionalism. Like norms, or “the constitutive rules and practices prescribing 
appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations” (March & Olsen, 
2006: p.3), these standards prescribe and proscribe party behaviour, thereby 
permitting and inhibiting the effective functioning of parties. Because of its focus 
on norms, the sociological institutional approach thus fits best to the research 
question investigated in this paper.  
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Institutions are not static entities but are part of a dynamic environment 
in which they interact with other institutions (March & Olsen, 2006). Within 
normative institutionalism, interaction between institutions may lead to change 
because of a “misfit” between various institutions. This misfit creates pressure 
for institutional adaptation, or the internalization of “new norms, ideas and 
collective understandings” (Börzel & Risse, 2003: p.13). Whether internalization 
actually takes place and is thus of effect on the domestic process depends on 
national institutions. They can either absorb norms, thereby incorporating them 
in their domestic structures without substantially modifying the institutions 
themselves; accommodate norms, thereby adapting existing institutions without 
changing their essential features; or transform norms, thereby replacing 
institutions by new, substantially different ones. The likelihood of success of 
norm internalization, or the gradual transformation of the domestic process, 
increases when new norms and ideas are compatible with existing structures of 
understanding and meaning. Medium pressure for adaptation is instrumental in 
this process, as high pressure likely leads to inertia, and low pressure to 
accommodation/absorption of norms (Börzel & Risse, 2003).  
Bulmer & Padgett (2004) have identified a similar dynamic behind policy 
transfer in the European Union. This transfer can take on the forms of coercion, 
negotiation, or facilitated unilateralism. Whereas supranational authorities may 
coerce a state into adopting a certain policy, policy co-ordination through 
institutions is always of a unilateral, voluntary nature. In this case, institutions 
rely on persuasion to induce policy change in the member states and apply 
instruments such as the institutionalization of objectives, guidelines, 
benchmarking and performance monitoring in the process. In line with Börzel & 
Risse (2003), the likelihood of abortive transfer increases when conformation 
with new policies is conflictive with embedded national preferences (Bulmer & 
Padgett, 2004).  
As will become clear below, the European institutions discussed in this 
paper all apply facilitated unilateralism to create changes with regard to national 
party law. Even the European Court of Human Rights, which is a supranational 
authority, does not have the power to coerce states into adopting a certain 
policy. The institutions use precisely those instruments as identified by Bulmer & 
Padgett (2003), namely the institutionalization of objectives, guidelines, 
benchmarking and performance monitoring. As such they apply low to medium 
pressure for adaptation. When determining the influence of the European 
standards regarding political party legislation on national institutions it is thus 
important to identify embedded national preferences. If these preferences differ 
highly from the proposed changes in legislation, pressure for adaptation is likely 
to result in the accommodation/absorption of norms rather than norm 
internalization. As such national institutions will either incorporate the new 
norm in their domestic structures without substantially modifying the 
institutions themselves or adapt existing institutions without changing their 
essential features rather than replace institutions by new, substantially different 
ones. 
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European standards on political party legislation 
Over the last decade, several European institutions have developed an extensive 
array of rules, regulations, guidelines, and recommendations for political parties. 
This section of the paper describes the international instruments that currently 
exist in the field of political party legislation and distils from these instruments 
the general standards that the institutions apply. As was mentioned above, these 
standards consists of both a normative component related to the ills that the 
instrument aims to address and of a regulatory component which prescribes and 
proscribes certain types of party behavior, thereby permitting and inhibiting the 
effective functioning of parties. The institutions are discussed in order of 
normative pressure that they are able to exert over national institutions. As such, 
the European Court of Human Rights is discussed first, followed by the Council of 
Europe and the international party aid providers. The European Union is 
discussed last, as its work on political party legislation has no direct effect on 
national institutions, but rather reflects the trends in the standards of the other 
international institutions.   
 
European Court of Human Rights 
The interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by the 
ECtHR is not a static procedure but a progressive process that evolves over time 
(Keller & Stone Sweet, 2008). The general approach of the Court in its 
interpretation of the Convention is a teleological one, meaning that the Court 
aims to uphold the basic object and purpose of the Convention. However, the 
Court’s room for interpretation is sometimes limited by the clear meaning of the 
text. The protection of human rights and the maintenance and promotion of the 
ideals and values of a democratic society are objects and purposes that are often 
applied in interpretation (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 2009). In light of the ideals 
and values of a democratic society, the Court has “recognized that ‘democracy’ 
supposes ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’ (Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, 2009: p.6). In the process of interpreting the Convention, the Court 
relies on the principle of ‘proportionality’, meaning that the restriction must be 
an appropriate measure to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and upon the 
‘margin of appreciation doctrine’, which means that the prime responsibility for 
the protection of fundamental rights lies within the democratic state itself. 
Further important principles are related to: ‘fourth instance’, meaning that the 
Court does not function as a further court of appeal; ‘consistency’, meaning that 
interpretation of the Convention should be based on the Convention as a whole 
rather than separate articles; and ‘effective interpretation’, meaning that the 
Convention must be interpreted in a way that ensures effective protection of 
rights. The development of Convention rights by the Court, i.e. the extension of 
the scope and content of substantive rights, is based on standards found outside 
of the Convention and on precedent-based case law developed by the Court itself. 
In general the Court aims to follow state practice and it relies on other sources of 
international human rights standards. Among these other sources are 
instruments of the Council of Europe (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 2009). The 
Court has built a precedent-based case law. Precedents provide grounds for 
Court rulings and Convention rights are developed through precedent-based 
rationales (Keller & Stone Sweet, 2008).  
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For the purpose of this study, the interpretation and development of the 
Convention need to be seen in the standard that the Court applies in the process. 
This standard is not static, however. Instead, it is adjusted on a continuous base 
through the cases that are brought before the ECtHR. The following sections 
show that over the last decade, the Court has developed extensive jurisprudence 
that both supports party proscription through national party law, thereby 
forbidding some parties from operating entirely, and permits other parties to 
operate freely as opposed to provisions in national party law. As such the Court 
protects certain parties over others and effectively prescribes a party ideal. This 
party ideal is based upon certain assumptions about the importance of political 
parties for democracy and the type of party that will uphold this role as opposed 
to other types of parties.  
 
The interpretation of Article 11 
The following rights are protected in Article 11 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights 
by members of the armed forces, of the police or the administration of the 
State. 
The Young, James and Webster Case (judgment of 13 August 1981, §57), albeit 
unrelated to political parties, led to an important first interpretation regarding 
Article 11 that has subsequently been applied to political parties ever since. In its 
ruling the Court established a connection between the freedom of association 
and Article 10, freedom of expression. “The protection of personal opinion 
afforded by Articles 9 and 10 (art. 9, art. 10) in the shape of freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and of freedom of expression is also one of the purposes 
of freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11 (art. 11). Accordingly, it 
strikes at the very substance of this Article (art. 11) to exert pressure, of the kind 
applied to the applicants, in order to compel someone to join an association 
contrary to his convictions” (§57).  As of the United Communist Party of Turkey 
Case2, this link gained importance in cases involving political parties. The Court 
ruled that parties play “an essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper 
functioning of democracy” (§46), thus placing them firmly within the scope of 
Article 11.  
From the United Communist Party of Turkey Case onwards, the Court follows 
three analytical steps to determine whether Article 11 has been breached:  
                                                        
2 A list containing the issues, verdicts, and dates of judgment of all the ECtHR cases involving 
Article 11 and political parties can be found in Appendix 1.  
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1) The Court analyzes whether an interference with the applicant’s rights 
granted by paragraph one of Article 11 took place. Not only the 
dissolution but also the refusal of authorities to register a party is seen as 
an interference with the applicant’s rights. This does not mean that 
national authorities violate Article 11 when they refuse to register parties 
or associations with misleading or defamatory names (Mowbray, 2007). 
2) If interference did take place, the Court determines whether the 
justifications for interference provided for under paragraph two of Article 
11 were present. The first justification is ‘prescription by law’ (Mowbray, 
2007). A finding of unlawfulness immediately results in the judgment of a 
breach of Article 11, as happened in the case of the Presidential Party of 
Mordovia v. Russia. Lawfulness implies that the interference is not only 
made with reference to law, but also that the law is formulated in such a 
way as to “enable those to whom it applies to foresee to a reasonable 
degree the consequences of their actions” (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 
2009: p. 521). After establishing that the law prescribes the interference, 
the Court goes on to check whether the interference is justified because it 
protects one of the objectives specified in paragraph two and thus has a 
‘legitimate aim’.  
3) The third step is to determine whether the interference was ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ (Mowbray, 2007; Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 2009). 
In cases involving political parties, the Court generally finds that the law 
did prescribe the interference and that the interference has a legitimate 
aim. It often differs with national governments on whether the 
interference was necessary in a democratic society. The Court has 
subsequently developed an extensive case law on these points.  
  
Case law on political parties and democracy 
The United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey Case created a precedent that 
has been upheld in all following cases related to political parties. This case 
contested a ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court that dissolved the United 
Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) and consequently banned its leaders from 
holding political office in other political parties (as established under Turkish 
law). The main reasons for this decision were the insertion of the word 
‘communist’ into the name of the party and the mention that was made in the 
party’s constitution and program of a Kurdish minority. Both of these issues 
conflicted with provisions within the Turkish Constitution and national law. The 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the dissolution of the United 
Communist Party was a disproportionate penalty. It remarked that because of 
the important role that political parties play in a democratic society, the state 
only has a limited margin of appreciation when determining the necessity to 
restrict the right to freedom of association. This “goes hand in hand with 
rigorous European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions 
applying it, including those given by independent courts”3 (§46). In the same 
case the Court determined the limits within which political groups may conduct 
their activities while enjoying the protection of the Convention’s provisions. A 
                                                        
3 Appendix 2 specifies all the cases that have subsequently invoked this argument of ‘limited 
margin of appreciation’.  
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political group may seek “to debate in public the situation of part of the State’s 
population and to take part in the nation’s political life in order to find, according 
to democratic rules, solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned”4 (§57). 
The standard that the Court upholds in this judgment consists of several 
elements. The first element is a normative one that indicates that the Court came 
to this specific ruling because of the importance of parties within a democratic 
society. As was already mentioned above, this case established that political 
parties fall under Article 11 because their essential role in ensuring pluralism 
and the proper functioning of democracy. Upholding these principles is the 
higher goal that the judgment aims to achieve. The regulatory element is very 
permissive towards the effective functioning of parties and warns states that 
they have a very limited amount of leeway in this field. The Court takes it upon 
itself to supervise decisions that inhibit the effective functioning of parties to 
ensure that they were taken in line with the ECHR provisions protecting party 
rights. As long as they play by the democratic rules, parties should be able to 
enter into public debate and into political life, even if they campaign on behalf of 
only a part of the State’s population.   
In the Socialist Party v. Turkey Case the Court extended its case law on 
political parties. The applicants within this case maintained, and the Court ruled, 
that the dissolution of the Socialist Party by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
infringed upon their right to freedom of association. The Court determined that 
an infringement upon rights protected in Article 11 is only necessary in a 
democratic society when it meets a ‘pressing social need’ and when it is 
‘proportionate to the aim pursued’5 (§49). It subsequently formulated the 
conditions under which a political party may campaign for political programs 
that challenge the basic ideology and constitutional structure of the state: “(1) 
the means used to that end must in every respect be legal and democratic; (2) 
the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic 
principles. It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite 
recourse to violence, or propose a policy which does not comply with one or 
more of the rules of democracy or is aimed at the destruction of democracy and 
infringement of the rights and freedoms afforded under democracy cannot lay 
claim to the protection of the Convention against penalties imposed for those 
reasons”6 (§46-47). In this case, the Court extends the permissive stance that it 
introduced in the United Communist Party of Turkey Case mentioned above. It 
adds to this position the conditions under which parties should be permitted to 
function effectively, even when the party’s proposals challenge the ideology and 
structure of the state. If these conditions are present, no ‘pressing social need’ 
exists to justify inhibiting their functioning and the dissolution of a party is not 
                                                        
4 Appendix 2 specifies all the cases that have subsequently invoked this argument of ‘the limits 
within which political groups may conduct their activities while enjoying the protection of the 
Convention’s provisions. 
5 Appendix 2 specifies all the cases that have subsequently invoked this argument of ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’. 
6 Appendix 2 specifies all the cases that have subsequently invoked this argument of ‘the 
conditions under which a political party may campaign for political programs that challenge the 
basic ideology and constitutional structure of the state’.  
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‘proportionate to the aim pursued’. The Court shows a clear preference for a 
‘immunized democratic’ approach to address anti-democratic threats or 
tendencies. This is an approach that is generally present in “strongly liberal 
democracies where the presumption is heavily against judicial measures and 
when the latter are used – in cases where ‘a clear and present danger’ exists 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ – there are checks and balances which ensure they 
are stronger and last no longer than is strictly necessary” (Pedahzur, 2001, in 
Bale, 2007: p.143). 
The Socialist Party Case thus determines that “the change proposed must 
itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles” (§46-47. This 
poses definitional challenges (Janis, Kay, Bradley & MacColgan, 2008), as is 
clearly visible in the cases of Yazar and Others v. Turkey and Dicle for the 
Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey. Both cases involve the dissolution of 
political parties by the Turkish Constitutional Court, based on accusations that 
they sought to undermine Turkey’s national and territorial integrity by their 
references to the Kurdish cause. The ECtHR held that principles “such as the 
right to self-determination and recognition of language rights, are not in 
themselves contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy. … if merely by 
advocating those principles a political group were held to be supporting acts of 
terrorism, that would reduce the possibility of dealing with related issues in the 
context of a democratic debate and would allow armed movements to 
monopolise support for the principles in question. That in turn would be 
strongly at variance with the spirit of Article 11 and the democratic principles on 
which it is based” (Yazar and Others v. Turkey, §57). According to the Court, the 
challenge these parties posed to the status quo of the state did no create a 
‘pressing social need’ and their dissolution was thus disproportionate to the aim 
pursued (§57). This judgment again reflects the permissive stance and the 
‘immunized democratic’ approach adopted by the Court. Judicial measures 
should only be taken in light of a clear threat to democracy and should be 
appropriate to the end they seek to achieve. The Court disagrees with the 
Turkish Constitutional Court that to advocate the right to self-determination and 
the recognition of language rights runs contrary to the fundamental principles of 
democracy. It states that the inhibition of the functioning of parties in such 
circumstances could create an even bigger threat to democracy and to 
Convention rights. The Court’s normative stance is also visible in this judgment. 
As was already mentioned above, political parties are important not only 
because they uphold democracy but also because they ensure pluralism within 
the party system.  
The same does not go for principles regarding legal and political 
pluralism, however. In the case of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others v. 
Turkey the Court found no violation of Article 11. Applicants in this case were the 
‘Refah Partisi’ and its chairmen who held that the dissolution of the party, at the 
time part of the governing coalition, violated Article 11. The Turkish 
Constitutional Court had dissolved the party because of its activities against the 
principle of secularism. The ECtHR ruled the introduction of sharia to be 
“incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the 
Convention” (§123) and attached importance to extreme views expressed by 
leading members of the party regarding the use of violent means to achieve their 
political goals. The dissolution of the party thus met a ‘pressing social need’ as 
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this decision defended democratic principles that were at risk of being 
undermined. The Court put forward the following points to examine whether a 
dissolution is justified in this light: “(i) whether there was plausible evidence 
that the risk to democracy, supposing it had been proved to exist, was 
sufficiently imminent; (ii) whether the acts and speeches of the leaders and 
members of the political party concerned were imputable to the party as a 
whole; and (iii) whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party 
formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived and 
advocated by the party which was incompatible with the concept of a 
“democratic society”” (§104). This method has subsequently been applied in the 
cases of Linkov v. The Czech Republic  and Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and 
Ungureanu v. Romania. In the Socialist Party Case the Court already established 
that a political party whose leaders incite recourse to violence does not comply 
with fundamental democratic principles. The fact that the Court finds the ‘Refah 
Partisi’ to present a ‘pressing social need’ because its leading members do not 
denounce the use of violent means to achieve political goals is thus nothing new. 
Its view on the acceptability of the political principles held by the ‘Refah Partisi’ 
adds a new element to its rather permissive stance on party functioning. In this 
case the Court moves from its previous permissive stance to a more inhibitive 
stance. According to the Court, the promotion of legal and political pluralism (i.e. 
multiple legal and political systems within one country) is incompatible with 
fundamental democratic principles). With this approach the Court shifts from the 
‘immunized democracy’ category where extreme subversive parties are dealt 
with within the boundaries of the law and under consistent judicial examination 
to the ‘defending democracy’ category applied by regimes that, when under 
attack, “might consider flexing the boundaries of ‘the rule of law’ to enable a 
proper response to the challenges. Democracies of this sort may exclude political 
parties from taking part in elections as long as there is a constitutional or legal 
authorization to do so” (Pedahzur, 2001: p.352).  
The Court also deemed a ‘pressing social need’ to allow for the dissolution 
of the Spanish Batasuna party and its proxies (Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. 
Spain. The Spanish Court had banned the party after a review of evidence that 
showed the party to function as the political wing of the armed Basque separatist 
group ETA. “The Court endorses the arguments of the Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Court, and considers that the actions and speeches attributed to 
the political parties that constitute the group of complainants, give a clear image 
of the model of society conceived and advocated by the parties that would 
contradict the concept of "democratic society" (§93, translation FM). Again, an 
inhibitive element is added to the general permissive stance of the Court. The 
presence of a party that functions as a political wing for a terrorist organization 
is incompatible with fundamental democratic principles.  
One last example of political party case law that the Court has established 
over the last decade is of a rather different nature than the previous ones. 
Instead of focusing on the conditions under which parties should be permitted or 
can be inhibited to function, this case focuses on the obligations of states towards 
parties.  The Convention transfers not only negative obligations onto the 
Contracting Parties, i.e. obligations to refrain from violating the rights and 
freedoms embodied within the Convention, but also positive obligations to 
“secure the effective exercise of Convention rights” (Heringa & van Hoof, 2006: 
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p.836). With regard to Article 11, a positive obligation was established in the 
case of Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece. This case dealt with a situation in 
which authorities refrained from intervening in, and even participated in, a mob 
attack on the headquarters of a political party with links to the Macedonian 
minority living in Greece. The Court held that “where the authorities could 
reasonably foresee the danger of violence to members of an association and clear 
violations of freedom of association they should take appropriate measures to 
prevent, or at least contain, the violence.  A related positive obligation is the duty 
to undertake an effective investigation into complaints of interference with 
freedom of association by acts of private individuals” (Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, 2009: p. 536). The Court thus established the precedent that 
protection of political party rights under the ECHR does not only mean that 
states should respect their rights, but also that states should actively ensure that 
party rights are not violated.  
 
National and international standards 
As was explained above, the development of Convention rights by the Court, i.e. 
the extension of the scope and content of substantive rights, is partly based on 
standards found outside of the Convention. In general the Court aims to follow 
state practice, although this does not necessarily mean that it waits until all 
states have adopted a specific interpretation of a right before it adjusts its 
interpretations. The Court furthermore relies on other sources of international 
human rights standards. Among these other sources are instruments of the 
Council of Europe (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 2009). Both of these standards 
have been used in cases related to political parties. 
In the case of the Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v 
Romania the judgment of the Court relied in part on the practices in other states. 
The refusal of Romanian courts to register a communist political party was 
deemed a violation of Article 11 and a disproportionate measure as the party’s 
constitution and programme were found to uphold democratic principles. “[The 
Court] observes that that context cannot by itself justify the need for the 
interference, especially as communist parties adhering to Marxist ideology exist 
in a number of countries that are signatories to the Convention” (§58). In its 
judgments the Court thus has an eye for established practices in the member 
states.  
The case of the Parti Nationaliste Basque – Organisation Régionale 
D’Iparralde v. France illustrates the fact that the Court uses other sources of 
international human rights standards to support its own opinion. The Court had 
to assess whether the rejection to authorize a funding association with 
connections to a foreign political party of the Basque Nationalist Party – 
Iparralde Regional Organization was a violation of Article 11. The Court was of 
the opinion that this prohibition “undoubtedly has a significant impact on [the 
party’s] financial resources and hence its ability to engage fully in its political 
activities” (§37). In its assessment of whether convincing and compelling reasons 
justified this restriction of the freedom of association, the Court noted that it 
failed to see how funding from a foreign political party (rather than a foreign 
State) undermined state sovereignty, especially in the light of the creation of 
transnational parties in the European Union. However, it ruled that this issue 
falls within the Contracting Party’s margin of appreciation and that this opinion 
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is supported both by other sources of international human rights standards such 
as the opinion of the Venice Commission and by national practice. In line with 
these standards, the Court found no violation of Article 11. Whereas in cases 
involving the dissolution of political parties, the Court has put a clear limit on the 
member states’ margin of appreciation, this argument does not go for matters 
regarding party financing. Perhaps this is due to the fact that no clear standard 
for the regulation of party financing exists within the member states.  
The case of Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain also included references 
to other sources of international human rights standards. The Court ruled that 
the Spanish authorities had not violated Article 11 when they banned the 
Batasuna party and its proxies in response to a pressing social need. For its 
assessment of whether this need was present, the Court relied on the European 
Framework Decision on the fight against terrorism, resolution 1308(2002) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Common Position of 
the European Council of 2003 (2003/402/CFSP) on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism. This shows that the Court can take into account 
human rights instruments of other European bodies, such as the Council of 
Europe and the European Union, when assessing the proportionality and the 
pressing social need that provide the rational for the inhibition of effective party 
functioning.  
 
Standard of the European Court of Human Rights regarding political party rights 
The last decade has witnessed a profusion of ECtHR precedent-based case law on 
the right of freedom of association for political parties, which for the larger part 
resulted from cases against Turkey. The Court’s judgments show a clear 
appreciation both for national practices regarding human rights standards and 
for other international human rights standards found at the European level. In 
order for states to stay clear of violating the ECHR, they should ensure that their 
political party legislation reflects the standard regarding political party rights 
established through this case law.  
The previous analysis brought to light several normative and regulatory 
elements that make up this standard. The normative elements hold that parties 
are important within a democratic society because of their essential role in 
ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy. Upholding these 
principles is the higher goal that ECtHR judgments aim to achieve. Because the 
Court puts such importance on parties, it adopts a permissive regulatory stance 
towards the effective functioning of parties. States have a very limited amount of 
leeway to interfere with the effective functioning of parties and can only do so in 
light of a ‘pressing social need’ through the application of a measure 
proportionate to the aim pursued. A pressing social need is present when parties 
show an inclination to use violent means to achieve their goals or when they 
propose principles that run counter to fundamental democratic ones. Parties 
should be allowed to campaign for political programs that challenge the basic 
ideology and constitutional structure of the state, as long as they use legal and 
democratic means in the process and do not propose principles that run counter 
to fundamental democratic ones. They should also be allowed to advocate the 
right to self-determination and the recognition of language rights, as the 
prohibition of such programs runs counter to the normative goal of ensuring 
pluralism. The Court does not stretch the principle of democratic pluralism as far 
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as to include legal and political pluralism or terrorism. Parties that advocate such 
principles pose a threat to democracy, thereby creating a ‘pressing social need’ 
that allows for interference with their functioning. The Court has furthermore 
ruled that issues related to party financing fall within the margin of appreciation 
of its member states and that states have the positive obligation to protect party 
rights.  
The Court’s main standard is that because of their essential role within 
democracy and pluralism, the effective functioning of political parties should not 
be inhibited unless their behavior or principles pose a clear threat to democracy. 
Because of the Islamic and terrorist threats to democracy present in the Refah 
Partisi v. Turkey and the Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain Cases its standard 
changed from one that is commonly found in ‘immunized democracies’, or 
strongly liberal democracies that are generally opposed to judicial measures 
against political parties to one commonly found in ‘defending democracies’, or 
liberal democracies that change the boundaries of the ‘rule of law’ in response to 
a serious threat.   
 
Council of Europe 
Just as party law in various European countries, the work of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) on party law touches upon parties and party legislation in three 
ways. Its earliest body of work addresses the issue of prohibition and dissolution 
of political parties and looks at the more specific issue of extremist parties and 
movements and the consequences they present for the freedom of association. 
This is followed by work related to political party funding and corruption. Over 
the last two years the CoE has started working on the promotion of desirable 
internal characteristics of political parties. The following sections discuss each 
dimension in more detail to identify the normative and regulatory standards that 
the CoE applies.  
 
Conditions and restrictions for political parties 
The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of 
the CoE has regulated the prohibition and dissolution of political parties in two 
sets of guidelines (see: Venice Commission, 1999; Venice Commission, 2004). 
Concerns with “the promotion of the fundamental principles of democracy”, “the 
rule of law”, and “the protection of human rights” (Venice Commission, 1999: p.4; 
2004: p.2) lay at the base of these guidelines. The essential role that political 
parties play in democracy is emphasized and parties, freedom of political opinion 
and freedom of association are labeled the “primordial elements of any genuine 
democracy as envisaged by the Statute of the Council of Europe” (Venice 
Commission, 1999: p.4). Both documents stipulate that the right to associate 
freely in political parties is protected as part of the freedom of association 
protected under Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
reference is made to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  
The Recommendation and Resolutions adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) show an interesting shift in the way 
that the Parliamentary Assembly addresses the threat to democracy by extremist 
parties and movements in Europe and the subsequent need to restrict political 
parties in the Council of Europe member states (Rec. 1438(2000), Res. 
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1308(2002) and Res. 1344(2003)). All documents apply the same ECHR-inspired 
legislative and normative framework as the previously mentioned guidelines, i.e. 
the principles of “legality”, “proportionality”, and “what is necessary in a 
democratic society”. The shift in the political and societal contexts that gave rise 
to the adoption of the Recommendation and Resolutions is accompanied, 
however, by a shift in the principles that the Recommendation and Resolutions 
place emphasis upon. The principle of proportionality is stretched to meet the 
growing need of democratic societies.  
In 2000 the Assembly (Rec. 1438(2000)), concerned by the erosion of 
democratic values, makes no mention of the possibility to restrict extremist 
parties and movements but recommends its member states to combat 
“intolerance, xenophobia, discrimination and racism at the root” through 
education and the addressing of social and economic needs. After the events of 
9/11, the Assembly adopts Resolution 1308(2002) in which it states that if a 
political party resorts to violence or poses a threat to law and order and the 
country's democratic system, it may be legitimate to ban or dissolve it. 
Preference is nonetheless given to less radical steps.  
Resolution 1344(2003) moves even farther away from the preventive 
solution offered to the problem of political extremism in the first 
Recommendation. Countries are instructed to use restrictive measures whenever 
this is deemed necessary. Dissolution of extremist parties is acceptable in 
exceptional cases where parties pose a threat to the country’s constitutional 
order. Whereas the 1999 Guidelines recommended prohibition of political 
parties in cases where parties use violence or advocate this use, Resolution 
1344(2003) states that “even if [political extremism] does not directly advocate 
violence, it generates a climate conducive to the escalation of violence. It is a 
direct threat because it jeopardizes the democratic constitutional order and 
freedoms, and an indirect threat because it can distort political life”. Likewise, 
the 1999 Guidelines differentiate between party behavior and the behavior of 
individual party members, whereas Resolution 1344(2003) calls for the 
application or introduction of “effective penalties where cases of proven damage 
caused by an extremist political party or one of its members are established”. It 
is not clear whether the party is to be punished for the behavior of its members 
or not, but this invitation certainly links extremist political parties to their 
members. The Resolution’s concern with the party’s internal functioning is 
another new aspect linked to political extremism that was not mentioned in the 
previous Guidelines and Resolutions. According to the preambles “[e]xtremist 
parties and movements are often oligarchies with a strong hierarchical structure, 
which do not apply democratic principles internally”. This concern may well 
have resulted in point 4 of the Resolution which invites political parties “to 
devise a new code of ethics, basing their programmes and activities on respect 
for fundamental rights and freedoms”.  
 The CoE documents on the prohibition and dissolution of political parties 
show a clear shift from the standard that they apply regarding this issue. With 
regard to the normative side of this standard, the documents mention that 
political parties play an essential role within democracy and should therefore be 
protected against measures that aim to prohibit or dissolve them. Before the 
events of 9/11 extremist parties and movements are seen as a representation of 
undemocratic sentiments in society. The CoE thus seeks to counter their rise 
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through measures that address the roots of these sentiments, rather than the 
parties themselves. In 2002 the CoE states that extremist parties that resort to 
violent means pose a threat to democracy. If necessary, states can legitimately 
decide to ban or dissolve them. In 2003 the CoE takes this point of view even 
further by establishing that not only violent extremist parties pose a threat to 
democracy but that political extremism in general does so as well. It also 
introduces the internal party structure as one of the elements that determine 
whether a party is an extremist one or not. The standard of the CoE has thus 
moved from permissive towards more restrictive of the effective functioning of 
parties.  As such, it portrays a similar shift as the ECtHR from applying an 
approach common in  ‘immunized democracies’ to one commonly found in 
‘defending democracies’. 
 
Political party financing 
The Guidelines and report on the financing of political parties (Venice 
Commission, 2001) are the CoE’s first body of work regarding political party 
financing. The document is based on a comparative report of national legislation 
of political party finance and thereby pays attention to state practice in this area. 
In the introduction to the Guidelines the Commission notes its concern caused by 
recent financial scandals involving political parties in Europe. This type of 
behavior is incompatible with “the essential role of political parties within 
democracy” (p.2). The document addresses issues such as public financing, 
private financing, electoral campaigns, and control and sanctions. Public funding 
should be distributed equally and entail an element of transparency. Private 
financing is acceptable, but limitations upon it can be envisaged. Electoral 
campaign expenses should be subject to a ceiling and irregularities in party 
financing should be met by sanctions.  
The Parliamentary Assembly expresses a concern similar to that of the 
Venice Commission when it notes that citizens are increasingly distrustful of 
political parties due to corruption scandals and the fading independence of 
political parties from financial means. Since parties are “an essential element of 
pluralistic democracies”, the Assembly proposes changes in legislation on 
political party financing to help citizens regain their confidence in the political 
system. Issues that need to be addressed through the regulation of party finances 
consist of corruption, the loss of independence of political parties, and the 
wielding of disproportionate influence on political decisions through financial 
means. The main difference with the Venice Commission Guidelines lies in the 
addition of rationale for several of these measures. Political parties should 
receive financial contributions from the state budget in order to prevent 
dependency on private donors and to guarantee equality of chances between 
political parties (but: excessive reliance on state funding can lead to the 
weakening of links between parties and their electorate); specific rules need to 
be applied to private financing as this type of financing, and donations in 
particular, creates opportunities for influence and corruption. The Parliamentary 
Assembly also introduces a new measure, namely the encouragement of citizen 
participation in political parties as an additional source of financial support for 
them. 
The Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2003)4 on common rules 
against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns has 
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two goals. Firstly, it aims to achieve greater unity between member states’ rules 
in this field. Secondly, it aims to fight corrupt practices that are currently 
plaguing political parties. The Recommendation largely mirrors the concerns put 
forward in the previous documents regarding the important role that parties 
play in democracy and the discrediting of parties that occurs through corruption 
scandals. The rules that the Committee recommends to member States embody 
most of the points mentioned in the previous two texts: public funding, private 
funding, donations, elections, transparency, supervision, and sanctions. It does 
not mention rationale for these rules, as the PACE Recommendation did. Instead, 
the focus of these rules lies more in the specification of general principles that 
legislation should apply. As such, “states should ensure that any support from the 
state and/or citizens does not interfere with the independence of political 
parties”, and donations should ‘avoid conflicts of interest; ensure transparency of 
donations and avoid secret donations; avoid prejudice to the activities of political 
parties; and ‘ensure the independence of political parties’ (Article 3:a).  
Funding from foreign donors presents a thorny issue for the CoE. 
Whereas the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers prohibits all 
donations from foreign donors (Article 7), the Venice Commission explicitly 
holds that “this prohibition should not prevent financial donations from 
nationals living abroad” (Guideline 6). At the request of the European Court on 
Human Rights the Venice Commission drew up an opinion on the prohibition of 
financial contributions to political parties from foreign sources (2006). Through 
a comparison of national party legislation on the financing of political parties by 
foreign political parties the Venice Commission found that the financing of 
political parties by foreign political parties is commonly prohibited or limited by 
the member States. However, under Community law, financing of a political party 
established in a member country of the EU by a party established in another 
member state of the EU may only be restricted or prohibited based on 
exceptional circumstances related to public security. This opinion does not 
provide any new guidelines on political party financing. However, it does touch 
upon the interplay between European legislation and national legislation.  
  The standard regarding political party financing applied by the three CoE 
bodies consists of normative and regulatory elements. The normative element is 
formed by the argument that political parties play an essential role in democracy. 
Corruption scandals lead to the loss of public trust in their functioning and are 
therefore detrimental to the parties’ ability to fulfill this essential role. 
Furthermore, the providers of party funding should not be able to exert influence 
over the party as this would create a situation of unequal representation. All 
three bodies roughly apply similar regulatory elements to address these 
perceived ills. Political parties should receive public funding in an equal, 
transparent, and independent manner to prevent party dependency on private 
donors. Private financing is acceptable but should be of a limited value, should be 
provided in a transparent manner, and should not endanger the independence of 
parties. Not all legal entities should be able to give private donations to parties. 
Electoral campaign expenses should be subject to a ceiling, accounts should be 
publicized and monitored independently, and irregularities in party financing 
should be met by sanctions. The Parliamentary Assembly would also like to see 
parties increase their membership base as an additional source of funding. 
Although the Venice Commission recommends enabling some forms of foreign 
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party funding, the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers, which has a 
higher standing, outlaws all foreign donations.  
 
Internal party organization 
From the mid-2000s onwards the CoE has directed its focus towards the 
development of democracy. Within its integrated ‘Making democratic institutions 
work’ project constant mention is made of the importance of and problems 
related to effective representation (Pratchett & Lowndes, 2004: p.53) and of 
political discontent and its effects on liberal democracy (Schmitter & Trechsel, 
2004). The development of internal party democracy is offered as a desirable 
solution to these developments (Schmitter & Trechsel, 2004). 
PACE Resolution 1407(2004) New concepts to evaluate the state of 
democratic development addresses the “dangerous crisis which can be seen in 
the low turn-out at elections, lack of interest and low participation of citizens in 
public life [and] decreasing respect for and confidence in political parties and 
politicians” (p.1). According to the Assembly the full integration of democratic 
norms and practices is needed to ensure sustainable democratic reform and 
development. PACE Recommendation 1680(2004) ‘New concepts to evaluate the 
state of democratic development’ focuses on the courses of action that the CoE 
bodies need to undertake to complement the proposals put forward in the 
previous Resolution. Two things stand out in this Recommendation. Firstly, the 
Recommendation states that there is a need for “clear European guidelines on 
how political parties could be financed” (p.1). It does not mention 
Recommendation 2003(4), which produced clear European guidelines on how 
political parties should be financed. Secondly, the Assembly instructs its 
competent steering committee to develop a code of good practice for political 
parties.  
The aim of PACE Resolution 1546(2007) Code of good practice for political 
parties is to address the crisis in public confidence that political parties face as it 
discredits the entire democratic system. It introduces several steps that political 
parties should take to enhance the reputation of the political system. These steps 
consist of improving their receptiveness to the concerns of individual citizens; 
improving their accountability; enhancing the role of the elected representatives; 
becoming more transparent and open; and refraining from making unrealistic 
promises to voters. It furthermore discusses the idea of a code of good practice 
for political parties, which would reinforce parties’ internal democracy, thereby 
increasing citizen appreciation of parties.   
As mandated in PACE Resolution 1546(2007), the Venice Commission 
created a Code of good practice in the field of political parties (2009). In line with 
previous CoE documents, prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties 
is only justified in cases where parties advocate the use of violence or use 
violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order. 
The Code applies the following guiding principles for political parties: ‘rule of 
law’, i.e. political parties should uphold international values on the exercise of 
civil and political rights; ‘democracy’, i.e. commitment to internal democracy is 
beneficial towards a democratic party system; ‘non-discrimination’, i.e. parties 
should adhere to ECHR standards regarding discrimination; and ‘transparency 
and openness’, i.e. “parties should offer access to their programmatic and 
ideological documents and discussions, to decision-making procedures and to 
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party accounts in order to enhance transparency and to be consistent with sound 
principles of good governance” (p.7). Other principles that are not explicitly 
mentioned in the explanatory section but that the Commission applies 
throughout the document consist of ‘representativeness and receptiveness’ and 
‘responsibility and accountability’. These principles can perhaps be interpreted 
as belonging to the principle ‘democracy’. Likewise, ‘democracy’ appears to 
entail an element of participation (point 35) and international co-operation 
(point 58).  Education is introduced as an aspect that needs to be arranged 
through parties. It is probable that training is added to spread democratic values 
or to encourage good practice within parties. Either way, this point adds an 
educational democratic norm to the Code. Point 28 is an interesting one in that it 
reveals that this Code targets European parties as well which it recommends 
should look at the contribution that direct membership could make on the 
legitimacy of transnational parties.  
The Code of good practice very precisely specifies the best practices with 
regard to the internal organization of political parties. The membership criteria 
of a political party should be transparently communicated through party statutes 
and should not be discriminatory or obligatory. Party membership may be 
refused to individuals that reject the values of the party or that are prohibited 
through domestic law to affiliate with a party. Transnational parties should think 
about the reinforcing effect on legitimacy that direct membership could provide 
them with. The party should clearly specify its structure and procedures in a 
party statute. These structures and procedures should reflect the opinion of the 
party members, should be available in a transparent manner, and should 
encourage accountable and responsible party behavior. Decision-making 
procedures that rely on principles of direct democracy or democratic delegation 
are preferable over other ones. The same goes for procedures regarding the 
appointment of leaders and candidates for election. Appointments should be 
made in a non-discriminatory manner. Care must be taken to create channels of 
communication between grassroots members and party leaders. Party statutes 
must be drawn up in line with constitutional, legal, and ECHR regulations, should 
establish a procedure for statutory change, must specify disciplinary procedures, 
and should define the national, regional or local organization of the party. 
The Code of good practice also touches upon the issue of party funding. 
Some differences are visible between these guidelines and the documents on the 
regulation on party funding discussed above. The Code has a broader aim than 
merely battling corruption, namely the need to reinforce political parties’ 
internal democracy. This is reflected in one of the points on party funding, which 
states that a party may not discriminate through the amount of dues it asks its 
members to pay. The Code furthermore targets political parties themselves, 
rather than political party legislation. The guidelines prescribe certain types of 
behavior that parties should display with regard to party financing: parties must 
adhere to laws; parties must refrain from receiving certain types of financial 
assistance; parties must ensure that their candidates adhere to regulations, party 
funding should be organized in an accountable and transparent manner, and 
parties should include auditory and supervisory mechanisms in their statutes. 
Interestingly enough, the Venice Commission fails to refer to the 2003 CoE 
Committee of Ministers Recommendation on common rules against corruption in 
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns.  
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As mentioned above, the Code discusses several specific functions of 
political parties. Parties should create a party program in a democratic manner. 
Although party programs are not binding, they should be published to promote 
transparency and accountability. Alterations to the program should be explained 
to the public. Parties should provide civic and political training and should 
cooperate internationally with other parties as a measure to creating solid 
democratic party systems. When in office, party members should take note of 
existing legislation when implementing their party program and should refrain 
from taking measures that create discriminatory conditions for other political 
forces. Both ruling and opposition parties must take care that their practices do 
not lead to erosion of the democratic debate and should inform civil society and 
voters in a transparent manner about their actions. They should also aim to fight 
corruption because of its ability to create public discontent with parties. 
Representatives should not change parties out of private interests and parties 
should actively create policies that counter these tendencies.  
According to the CoE, the representational impasse that parties currently 
find themselves in, which is the result of a crisis of public confidence and political 
discontent, forms an ill that undermines the functioning of liberal democracy. 
The CoE hopes to solve this impasse through the full integration of democratic 
norms and practices in political parties. Parties should therefore attempt to 
become more receptive, open, transparent, and accountable. They must show 
their responsibility by dedicating themselves to credible electoral promises and 
by enhancing the role of their representatives. These normative elements are 
reflected within the Venice Commission’s Code of good practice. This document 
prescribes guidelines for parties on the principles of ‘rule of law’, ‘democracy’, 
‘non-discrimination’, ‘transparency and openness’, ‘receptiveness and 
representativeness’, and ‘responsibility and accountability’. The Code offers 
standards and examples of good practice on the following aspects related to 
political parties: internal organization of political parties (membership, 
organization, and appointment of leaders and candidates for election), funding 
(private and public sources, restrictions, and supervisory mechanisms), and 
political functions (program, training, elections, performance in office and 
opposition, and international co-operation). The Code and its explanatory report 
do not elaborate on the selection of these specific aspects or the omission of 
other aspects related to political parties. This is particularly questionable for the 
political functions part, where the Code identifies functions such as training and 
international co-operation. It does not become clear why these functions are 
essential elements of parties and why standards of good practice need to be 
developed for them.  
 
Standard of the European Court of Human Rights regarding political parties 
The standard regarding political parties and political party legislation that the 
CoE applies has changed over the years. This change has occurred both within 
the normative element of the standard and within the dimensions that the CoE 
addresses. The first body of work of the CoE is concerned with the protection of 
political parties’ freedom of association and with the rise of extremist parties in 
Europe. The normative argument that the CoE applies is that political parties 
play an essential role within democracy and should therefore be protected 
against measures that aim to prohibit or dissolve them. Before the events of 9/11 
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extremist parties are seen as an ill of society rather than democracy. The 
normative element changes after 9/11 when extremist parties come to be seen 
as a direct threat to democracy because of the creation of violent tendencies that 
their policies may entail. As such the approach has shifted from that of an 
“immunize democracy” to that of a “defending democracy”. From 2002 onwards, 
the Parliamentary Assembly thus announces that states can legitimately decide 
to ban or dissolve them. In its 2003 Resolution the Parliamentary Assembly 
includes the internal party structure as one of the determinants of an extremist 
party. The regulatory standard of the CoE has thus moved from permissive 
towards more restrictive of the effective functioning of parties.  
Political party funding is a second dimension that the CoE becomes 
interested in. The Venice Commission publishes its first body of work on party 
funding in 2001, which culminates in a Committee of Ministers Recommendation 
in 2003. Again, the normative element of the standard applied here is formed by 
the argument that political parties play an essential role in democracy. 
Corruption scandals lead to the loss of public trust in their functioning and are 
therefore detrimental to the parties’ ability to fulfill this essential role. 
Furthermore, the providers of party funding should not be able to exert influence 
over the party as this would create a situation of unequal representation. All 
three bodies roughly apply similar regulatory elements to address these 
perceived ills. The CoE touches upon elements such as public and private 
funding, electoral campaign expenses, and monitoring and sanctioning 
procedures. The issue of foreign donations is a contentious one. These guidelines 
and recommendations are rather prescriptive and proscriptive of various types 
of party behavior.   
 From 2004 onwards the CoE becomes more concerned with the 
dimension of internal party organization. The norm behind this new direction 
reflects the normative concern present in its work on party funding. Parties find 
themselves in a crisis of public confidence, which undermines the functioning of 
liberal democracy, and should therefore incorporate democratic norms and 
practices into their internal structure to address this ill. They should attempt to 
become more receptive, open, transparent, and accountable. These normative 
elements are reflected within the Venice Commission’s Code of good practice, 
which applies the principles of ‘rule of law’, ‘democracy’, ‘non-discrimination’, 
‘transparency and openness’, ‘receptiveness and representativeness’, and 
‘responsibility and accountability’ to internal organization of parties, their 
funding, and their political functions. The Code of good practice is thus very 
prescriptive and proscriptive of the various types of party behavior.  
 
International party aid 
Party aid offered by international organizations addresses national political 
parties and political party legislation. Party aid is best defined as “any type of 
international assistance geared towards individual parties or the party system as 
a whole, with the purpose of strengthening democracy in a given country” 
(Catón, 2007: p.6). The aid providers consist of partisan non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), multi-partisan NGOs, non-partisan NGOs and 
intergovernmental organizations (Catón, 2007). Their support comes in the form 
of a party-to-party or multi-partisan approach, a cross-party dialogue or a focus 
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on institutions. Aid providers usually do not apply one type of aid but combine 
several ones (Burnell, 2004).  
Within the party-to-party approach, partisan NGOs collaborate with 
ideological partners, the so-called fraternal or sister parties, in other countries 
(Burnell, 2004). Examples of partisan NGOs that apply this approach are found in 
Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Öhman et al., 2005). Some 
difficulties exist in the process of selecting suitable sister parties. Parties on 
other continents often refrain from using ideologies as a foundation to build 
their work on. The desirability of favoring one party over others may be 
questionable, and the limited life span of new parties often inhibits cooperation 
(Burnell, 2004). 
 Within the multi-partisan approach organizations assist several, but not 
necessarily all parties in the process of developing democracy and parties. When 
using this approach it is important to offer equal opportunities to all parties. 
However, parties may be excluded because of a non-democratic or anti-
democratic character or because they portray a preference for the use of violent 
methods. The British Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is an 
organization that combines close party-to-party relations with a cross-party 
approach (Burnell, 2004). In the United States the National Democratic Institute 
for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) 
are the main actors engaged in party aid. They receive funding from the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and mainly undertake their work on a non-partisan basis 
(Öhman et al., 2005).  
Cross-party dialogue aims to improve the party system through 
discussions among parties. This type of program focuses on reaching inter-party 
agreements on the rules of the democratic game, leading to the consolidation of 
multi-party democracy. The Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy 
(NIMD) applies this approach. Many democracy promotion organizations also 
apply this approach themselves as a means to coordinate their activities in the 
field (Burnell, 2004).  
 The institutional approach focuses on the influence of the institutional 
context on political parties. Main points within this approach are the electoral 
system, the way parties are financed and the regulation concerning expenditure 
in elections, and the rules related to party registration and the sanctioning of 
their activities (Burnell, 2004). Organizations such as International IDEA and the 
UNDP specifically apply the institutional approach (Catón, 2007). 
The following sections analyze several of the approaches used to provide 
political party aid and thereby determine the standards regarding parties and 
party legislation that this aid applies. 
 
Multi-party approach 
The Westminster Foundation for Democracy was founded in 1992 and has two 
functions. It transfers money to British political parties to support party-to-party 
aid and it runs its own multi-party programs that aim to support political parties 
and pluralistic democratic institutions (Öhman et al., 2005). According to a 
publication of the WFD (Burnell, 2004) an effective party system, one of the 
essential elements of the process of democratization, is a system that is neither 
fragmented nor polarized. The electorate should be presented with meaningful 
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choices and parties should engage in responsible political competition. An 
effective system is also institutionalized, which means that it offers the electorate 
the opportunity to hold the elected leaders responsible for their behavior in 
office. Strategies that address the current worldwide decline in public confidence 
in political parties should be tailored to specific political situations. A variety of 
approaches (multi-party, institutional, etc.) are often thought to be most 
appropriate given the political context of a country’s party system. The strategies 
should promote a party structure that is open to influence and participation at 
the grass-roots level and that is increasingly open to women’s participation. 
Benchmarks for party development should include “levels of financial 
transparency, the development of a membership base, internal party democracy 
and opportunities for political progression by women” (Burnell, 2004: p. 23). 
Both the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) were formed in 1980s. 
Although they are linked to the two main American political parties, their 
support is of a non-partisan nature (Öhman et al., 2005). The NDI’s program for 
political parties encompasses five areas: comparative research, party systems, 
internal organization and structure, elections and campaigning, and legislative 
performance. With regard to the internal organization and structure of political 
parties, the NDI aims to create clear internal management and communication 
structures, organizational strength, and internal democracy. Parties should apply 
transparent and participative procedures to select candidates, elect leaders, and 
formulate policies. The NDI therefore focuses on enhancing internal party rules 
and procedures, on strengthening party branches, on improving a party’s 
membership outreach practices, and on increasing opportunities for 
participation by historically marginalized groups. A series of papers on various 
aspects of political parties within democracy, such as the selection of candidates 
for legislative office, the implementation of intra-party democracy, and the 
developments in party communications, form the theoretical basis for this party 
aid design (NDI, 2009).  
The NED is a private NGO that receives an annual appropriation from the 
U.S. Congress to provide grants to groups that strengthen democratic institutions 
around the world. Its grants for political party projects are structured through 
the NDI and IRI (NED, 2009). Its aim is to establish multiparty systems with 
institutionalized parties that are accountable to society at large. The NED applies 
a multi-party approach and only allows for the exclusion of parties that are not 
committed to democratic values. NED grants are used to provide infrastructure 
support and training in the fields of party organization and grassroots 
membership recruitment. The grants may not be applied to finance political 
campaigns (NED, 2008). 
USAID is an independent federal U.S. government agency that among 
other things provides financial assistance to projects that promote more genuine 
and competitive elections and political processes. For USAID, political parties are 
central to a well-performing democracy. Special attention should be paid to the 
performance of parties in office, as this is where they gain credibility and 
legitimacy. USAID political party aid aims to achieve four goals: 1) develop and 
consolidate representative democracies; 2) develop transparent political 
environments; 3) establish viable democratic parties; and 4) ensure  free and fair 
elections. Like the NED, USAID offers multi-party support and does not provide 
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party aid during election time. In order to determine whether a party adheres to 
democratic values, and is thus eligible for aid, USAID applies the following 
indicators: 1) support for peaceful, democratic means to obtain power; 2) 
respect for human rights and the rule of law; and 3) respect for freedom of 
religion, press, speech, and association (USAID, 2003). Programming in 
organizational development is most prevalent (Shaiko, 1999). In this area 
political party aid encourages parties to “demonstrate commitment to 
transparent, inclusive, and accountable democratic political processes”, to “adopt 
institutional structures that enable them to reflect the interests of those they 
choose to represent, and to compete effectively in periodic elections at all levels”, 
and to gain “the confidence of citizens, encourage citizen participation, and 
reinforce the legitimacy of democracy governance” (USAID, 1998: p.12-13).  
 
Cross-party approach 
The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy was founded in 2001. The 
NIMD is financed by the ministry of foreign affairs and sponsors impartial and 
inclusive projects. All Dutch parliamentary parties provide representatives for 
the organization’s administration. The parties also participate in and cooperate 
with the various projects (Öhman et al., 2005). 
According to NIMD’s Institutional Development Handbook: a framework 
for democratic party-building (2005) too much emphasis is put on the 
competitive function of democracy and more attention should be paid to the 
process through which democracy is constructed. This process consists of party 
elements such as participation, inclusiveness, tolerance and consensus building. 
Institutional development is defined as “the process whereby parties become 
better organized, practice democratic values and establish rules and procedures 
that will allow them to compete more effectively and be more successful in 
elections and at implementing their policy preferences” (p.8). The NIMD’s 
strategy is to avoid moving too rapidly when trying to democratize a party. 
Priority is given to gaining knowledge of (informal) party behavior before a 
course of action is decided upon (Mimpen, 2007). 
Criteria and indicators for measurement of the degree of democratic 
institutionalization of political parties lie in at least five areas: organizational 
strength, internal democracy, political identity, internal party unity, and 
electioneering capacity. Organizational strength means that parties can create 
durable strength through the application of foresight, endurance, resources and 
stability. Internal democracy means that a political party has “impersonal rules 
and procedures to avoid the arbitrary control of internal elections and party 
functioning by individual leaders or cliques” (Mimpen, 2007: p.11). Party finance 
and issues of electivity, accountability, transparency, inclusivity, participation, 
and representation are crucial in this area (Mimpen, 2007). Political identity is 
important because once identity is based on a clear policy orientation it can 
compete with materialistic opportunities and rewards over recruitment. Internal 
unity must be strengthened to ensure that democratic pluralism will not lead to 
factionalism. The NIMD aims to strengthen the electioneering capacity of parties 
through a strategy that combines party programs with constituency needs and 
the political environment. However, it does feel that party activists must refrain 
from too much party structuring, as this could inhibit institutional change and 
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renewal and might even provoke a rupture between the party or party system 
and a changing civil society (NIMD, 2004). 
  
Institutional approach 
International IDEA is a Swedish-based intergovernmental organization with a 
mission to support sustainable democracy. Its division on political parties has 
developed the following initiatives: internal democracy in political parties; 
effective party aid; parties in conflict-prone societies; political party finance; and 
research and dialogue on political parties (International IDEA, 2009a) The 
internal democracy initiative focuses on the development of more democratic, 
transparent and effective political parties through the identification of specific 
challenges for the internal management and functioning of parties and party 
systems. IDEA puts a specific focus on candidate selection, leadership selection, 
policymaking, membership relations, gender, minorities, youth and party 
funding (International IDEA, 2009b). Its aid focuses on party regulations in an 
attempt to create a favourable framework within which parties can work. Of 
importance in this regard are topics such as party registration, compliance 
requirements and party financing (Catón, 2007: p.15). 
 
Standard of the party aid providers regarding political parties and party legislation 
Party aid aims to address the ill of problematic democratic development, which 
is the consequence of the malfunctioning of political parties. Malfunctioning 
parties do not govern effectively and create a loss of public confidence and of 
participation in parties. The standard that party aid providers apply in their 
work regarding party systems and party organization has a normative element 
that prescribes an ideal for parties and party systems that would do away with 
this ill.  
Carothers (2006) deduced that “party aid organizations operate from a 
number of more specific ideas of what is a desirable party system: (1) political 
power within the system should be distributed among at least a few parties and 
not held primarily or by just one party; (2) at the same time, the system should 
not be fragmented among a large number of parties; (3) the system should be 
relatively stable but not so much that it prevents the entry of new parties; (4) the 
system should embody a fair amount of ideological diversity yet not be polarized 
around extremes” (p.98). The presence of such party systems is expected to lead 
to stable democracies. This element is visible in the analysis of the various party 
aid providers presented above. The WFD identifies party systems that are 
neither fragmented nor polarized, that offer meaningful choices and that are 
characterized by responsible party competition and institutionalization as 
essential elements for democratization. Likewise the NED aims to establish 
accountable multiparty systems with institutionalized parties.  
Creating effective parties is a central element within the strategies that 
aid providers apply to promote democratic change and development. They apply 
several regulatory principles, such as inclusiveness, representativeness, 
transparency, accountability, and institutionalization, that parties need to live 
up, in order for them to be able to play their democratizing role. In the words of 
Carothers (2006) they “seek to help build parties that are competently managed, 
internally democratic, well-rooted in society, law-abiding, financially transparent 
and adequately funded, ideologically defined, inclusive of women and youth, 
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effective at campaigning (especially grassroots campaigning), and capable of 
governing effectively. As was shown above, all party aid providers apply 
regulatory programs that aim to prescribe and proscribe party behavior based 
on these ideals, be it through their work with parties themselves, with party 
systems or with party legislation. In the process the party aid providers prefer to 
work with existing parties that adhere to democratic values.  This preference, 
combined with their preference for smaller party-systems without parties that 
hold an extreme ideology, makes that they are less concerned with the 
permission of effective functioning of parties than organizations that highly 
value the maintenance of democratic pluralism. 
 
European Union 
The Maastricht Treaty 
The history of the European Parliament goes back to the creation of the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. This body 
was subsequently transformed into the consultative European Parliamentary 
Assembly in 1958 and the European Parliament in 1962. In 1970 the Parliament 
gained power over areas of the Community’s budget and in 1975 this power was 
extended to power over the whole budget (Dinan, 2005). 1979 saw the first 
direct elections to the parliament, which led to the formation of transnational 
party federations at the European level (Lightfoot, 2005). These federations built 
upon the long history of party cooperation in the Common Assembly of the ECSC 
and the European Parliamentary Assembly (Jansen, 2006). The elected 
parliament obtained increasing legislative and supervisory authority through 
several rounds of treaty reform (Dinan, 2005).  
A first mention of political parties in the context of the European 
Parliament is made in Art. 138a of the Maastricht Treaty, which states that: 
 “Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration 
within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to 
expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.”  
Several European political scholars hold that intense pressure exerted by the 
transnational party federations lay at the base of the incorporation of Article 
138a into the Maastricht Treaty. (Dinan, 2005; Lightfoot, 2005; Hix & Lord, 
1997). According to Dinan (2005) the transnational party federations’ use of 
concepts such as democracy and accountability has been a common feature of 
their attempts over the years to gain more power. The European People’s Party 
(EPP), formed “a coalition of the willing” with the Socialist CSP and Liberal ELDR 
party federations (Johansson & Raunio, 2005: p.522). It used its connections to 
European high officials to ensure that the clause on political parties entered the 
Treaty (Jansen, 2006; Johansson & Raunio, 2005). The Maastricht European 
Council did indeed accept the clause, although the wording of the article 
remained open (Jansen, 2006), falling short of the “more substantial and precise 
wordings proposed on various occasions by the presidents of the three party 
federations. The Article specified neither the funding of Europarties nor their 
role in European elections and nomination procedures” (Johansson & Raunio, 
2005: p.522).  
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The Nice Treaty 
Upon conclusion of the Maastricht summit, several attempts were made to 
broaden the scope of Article 138a. No progress on the issue of a party statue was 
made during this Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) as more 
salient issues with regard to EU enlargement and the development of the foreign 
and security policy took precedence (Johansson & Raunio, 2005). The 
Amsterdam Treaty made but one change to the party article; it changed the 
article’s position from Art. 138a to Art. 191 (Schönlau, 2006).  
The five main Europarties combined their strengths to put a revision of the 
Article, so as to include legislation and funding of European political parties, on 
the agenda of the Nice IGC held in 2000 (Johansson & Raunio, 2005; Lightfoot, 
2005; Hix & Lesse, 2002). The line of argumentation used in support of this view 
was similar to that used to clear the way for Article 138a, namely that strong 
European parties could become essential for the upholding of democratic life and 
political debate in the Union”  (Johansson & Raunio, 2005). The parties were 
aided in their quest by a ruling of the European Court of Auditors, which held 
that the financial support that European party federations received from their 
parliamentary groups’ budgets was illicit and had to be terminated (Johansson & 
Raunio, 2005; Lightfoot, 2005; Jansen, 2006). Intensive lobbying of individual 
MEPs and the leaders of the Europarties brought the issue to the IGC agenda. The 
day before the European Council summit, the EPP hosted a summit during which 
the leaders reached a cross-party agreement on the issue. The Nice European 
Council in December 2000 adopted a legal basis for legislators to create a statute 
for political parties at European level. The following paragraph was added to 
Article 138a of the Maastricht Treaty:    
“The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251, shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European 
level and in particular the rules regarding their funding”  
 
Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003  
The Nice Treaty cleared the way for the introduction of European party 
legislation, but remained silent on matters of content. In 2001 the Commission 
submitted a proposal to the Parliament and the Council (Johansson & Raunio, 
2005). The Council of Ministers failed to unanimously accept a statute due to 
several disagreements regarding the need for parties to adhere to democratic 
principles, the need for representation in a certain amount of countries in order 
to be recognized, and issues of party funding (Hix & Lesse, 2002). Furthermore, 
several countries feared that a legal status or personality of European political 
parties would create momentum for the “’federal’ development of the union into 
a more and more ‘state-like’ polity” (Schönlau, 2006: p. 145). 
With the coming into force of the Nice Treaty in 2003, Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV) was introduced to the process, thereby eliminating the need for 
unanimity in the Council. The Commission swiftly proposed a new directive 
(Jansen, 2006). The statute was a far cry from the initial ideas of the Parliament’s 
Constitutional Affairs committee (Schönlau, 2006), but the Parliament and the 
Council both accepted it in June 2003 (Jansen, 2006).  
Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 defines a political party at European level 
as a body with members that are either citizens gathered together in the form of 
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a political party or political parties which together form an alliance. In order to 
be recognized as a party, this body must “have legal personality in the Member 
State in which its seat is located”; must “be represented in at least one quarter of 
Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national 
Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must 
have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per 
cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent 
European Parliament elections” (§3). It furthermore establishes that parties 
need to observe the principles on which the European Union is founded and that 
they should (intent to) participate in European elections. The procedures 
through which parties can apply for funding are specified as are the measures 
through which the Parliament can verify whether the applicants still qualify as 
parties. The regulation puts some restrictions on party behavior with regard to 
types of funding that parties are not allowed to accept and types of spending that 
they are not allowed to engage in. It prescribes behavior with regard to 
transparency of party funding and the nature of expenditure that is allowable.  
  
Resolution 2005/2224 (INI)  
Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 stipulates that: 
“The European Parliament shall publish a report not later than 15 February 
2006 on the application of this Regulation and the activities funded. The 
report shall indicate, where appropriate, possible amendment to be made to 
the funding system.” 
In March 2006 the Constitutional Affairs Committee presented this report to the 
European Parliament. The proposals for a European party statute, the 
establishment of political foundations at European level to encourage cross-
border political communication, and the creation of European lists in future 
European elections reached a lot further than the financial aspects that had been 
regulated so far (Leinen, 2006). 
 Upon reception of this report, the Parliament adopted non-legislative 
Resolution 2005/2224 (INI) in which it noted the existence of public ignorance 
of and disinterest in European institutions because of inadequate political 
communication and information on policy. The resolution presented strong 
European parties as the key element to address this problem. It furthermore 
advocated the elaboration of a genuine European party statute, including 
provisions on individual membership of European parties, on their management, 
and on the nomination of candidates, in order to create such strong parties. The 
Resolution mentioned several new structural issues that it requested the 
Commission to take into account:  European political foundations, European 
party lists, and European political youth foundations.  
The Resolution resulted in Regulation (EC) 1524/2007 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 and in a Feasibility study of a future European 
Statute of European Political Parties issued by the Committee of Constitutional 
Affairs.  
 
Regulation (EC) 1524/2007  
Although Regulation (EC) 1524/2007 is a lengthy document, it merely amends 
Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 on five points. Most importantly, it adds political 
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foundations to those political institutions eligible for European funding as they 
“may through their activities support and underpin the objectives of the political 
parties at European level notably in terms of contributing to the debate on 
European public policy issues and on European integration, including by acting 
as catalysts for new ideas, analysis and policy options” (p.1). Note that contrary 
to the Parliament’s wishes, the Regulation does not include youth organizations 
as institutions eligible for European funding. Secondly, ‘donations from any 
public authority from a third country’ are added as a new restriction on funding 
for parties and foundations at the European level. Thirdly, political parties at the 
European level may now use their funding for the financing of campaigns 
conducted for elections to the European Parliament. The Regulation states that 
this amendment is made “with a view to further enhancing and promoting the 
European nature of the elections to the European Parliament” (p.1). Fourthly, the 
European Parliament must adhere to transparency principles by creating a 
section of its website through which the public can access reports on funding of 
political parties and foundations at the European level. Lastly, the percentage of 
funding that the parties and foundations at European level may charge to the 
general budget of the European Union is raised from 75 % to 85%. The 
Regulation states that this amendment is made “in order to improve the 
conditions for the funding of political parties at European level, while 
encouraging them to ensure adequate long-term financial planning” (p.1). 
 
Feasibility study of a future European Statute of European Political Parties 
A request of the European Parliament’s committee on Constitutional Affairs led 
to the creation of a feasibility study that explores whether European law offers a 
legal base for the creation of a European political party statute. The study starts 
out with a comparative analysis of the development of legislation of political 
parties in the EU member states. Goal of this analysis is to determine whether 
specific trends in the development of party legislation are visible at the EU 
member state-level. The authors “assume that this will also impact the design of 
an EU-statute for parties at European level” (p.17). They find that a trend 
towards stronger regulation of political party registration, financing, and 
obligations and tasks does indeed exist, “which only provides more evidence for 
the need to mirror this trend at the EU level. The reasons for this trend have to 
do with transparency and party financing, clearer election rules, the 
consolidation of representative democracy and efforts to regain citizens’ trust in 
political parties and party politics through clearer laws and regulations” (p.10).  
The authors determine that only a statute for political parties at European 
level in the form of EU regulation can lead to the creation of a legal status and 
personality for European parties that is compatible with member state law. They 
find a legal base for such a statute in Art. 191 and a normative base in the 
previous efforts to regulate European political parties, which indicates altogether 
the will on part of the member states and the European Parliament for giving 
European political parties an important role in EU democracy” (p.11). The 
authors recommend that party regulation be based around general provisions 
and specific subjects such as internal party organizations and funding, “with 
particular paragraphs or articles on the status and functions of political parties at 
European level, their definition and legal personality, registration rules, party 
bans, internal structures, such as conventions or congresses, councils or political 
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bureaus, presidiums, conferences of party leaders, decision-making rules, 
membership provisions and, finally, provisions on funding aspects and taxation” 
(p.11). 
Although the European Parliament’s committee on Constitutional Affairs 
requested the creation of this study, the documents of its committee meetings 
make no mention of the discussion, or even reception, of this study. For the 
remainder of 2007 and 2008 the meetings focused on the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty (signed 13 December 2007).  
 
The Lisbon Treaty 
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has had several consequences for the 
status of parties within the European Union. First of all, the Lisbon Treaty gave 
force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. A first version 
of this Charter had already been adopted in 2000 and a modified version of the 
Charter formed part of the now defunct European Constitution. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights mentions political parties under the article on Freedom of 
assembly and association. During the drafting process, the question of whether 
to include political parties had been subject to debate, with political parties 
appearing and disappearing from the various draft versions (European 
Parliament, 2000a, b, c). In the final version of the Charter (2000) Article 12 
Freedom of assembly and of association mentions in its second paragraph that  
Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of 
the citizens of the Union. 
The explanation of the content of this paragraph given by the Parliament is that 
“[p]aragraph 2 of this Article corresponds to Article 191 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (European Parliament, 2000d, p.15). 
Although the Charter has been modified, this paragraph remained unchanged 
(Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007).  
The Treaty of Lisbon furthermore splits the content of Article 191 TEC 
into two separate articles. This is a direct result of the political deliberation 
process that culminated in the defunct ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe’. The European Council mandated the 2007 IGC that created the Lisbon 
treaty to integrate all the innovations resulting from the IGC on the European 
Convention into the new ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (General Secretariat, 
2007). A first draft version of the European Constitution only mentioned that 
“Political parties at European level contribute to forming a European awareness 
and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.” An explanatory 
note comments that as such, the Article resembles the wording of both Article 
191 TEC and Article 12(2) of the Charter (European Secretariat, 2003a). 
Members of the European Parliament made various requests to change the 
wording of the Article to reflect the entire content of Article 191 and even to 
substantiate it further with additions regarding internal party democracy 
(European Parliament, 2003). The Chairman of the Praesidium stated that the 
latter issue should be left to the Member States themselves (European 
Secretariat, 2003b). However, the revised text of the Constitution was amended 
to take into account the entire content of Article 191, albeit in two separate 
articles. The second paragraph of Article 191 became transplanted into the 
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institutional provisions of the Constitution (European Secretariat, 2003c). The 
Treaty of Lisbon adopted these revisions in its text, which resulted in Article 10 
and Article 224 in the consolidated versions of the treaties: 
Article 10 
4: Political parties at the European level contribute to forming European 
political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union. 
Article 224 
The European Parliament and Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, by means of regulations shall lay down the 
regulations governing political parties at European level referred to in 
Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union and in particular the rules 
regarding their funding.  
The main change with Article 191 is that the Lisbon Treaty leaves out the part 
which states that “[p]olitical parties at European level are important as a factor 
for integration within the Union”. It does not become clear why this is the case. 
 
Standard of the European Union regarding political parties 
The standard that the European Union applies towards parties has increased in 
regulatory scope over the years. Its normative element remains rather static. The 
party article in the Maastricht Treaty cleared the way for all other legislation on 
political parties. The transnational party federations initiated the process 
towards the adoption of this article through use of the argument that parties 
express the political will of citizens.  The party article in the Maastricht Treaty 
does not stipulate any regulatory elements but puts down the normative element 
that parties are important both for European integration and as a means for 
European citizens to express their will. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
mirrored the normative argument put forward in this article through its creation 
of a paragraph on political parties under the freedom of association. Because 
parties contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union, 
their rights are guaranteed under the charter. The transnational party 
federations continued to lobby for a statute for political parties at European 
level, claiming that strong parties are essential for upholding democratic life. The 
Nice Treaty mandated the creation of regulations governing parties and their 
funding, which were subsequently substantiated in Regulation EC 2004/2003. 
The regulation provides a definition of parties and specifies the procedures for 
their funding. From its definition it follows that European parties necessarily 
adhere to the values of the Union and to specific criteria regarding 
representation. These issues led to disputes in the process of adopting the 
regulation because some states and parties feared that the rules discriminated 
against certain parties or provided an undesired impetus for further European 
integration. Perhaps this is the reason why the European Convention, which was 
created in the same year, dropped the part of the party article that identifies as 
an important factor for integration within the Union. In 2005 the European 
Parliament proposed changes to Regulation EC 2004/2003 because it felt that 
stronger European parties were needed to improve communications with 
European citizens. It furthermore proposed the creation of a genuine party 
statute that would regulate the internal organization of parties more closely. As a 
result Regulation (EC) 1524/2007 modifies several issues related to party 
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funding and determines that parties may use this funding for electoral 
campaigns. It also introduces and defines European party foundations. 
Furthermore, a feasibility study of a future European party statute was created, 
which provides several recommendations on issues related to internal party 
organization that a future statute should address. The Union has not come so far 
as to address these issues through proposals or regulations. What becomes clear 
is that the regulatory element of the European standard regarding political 
parties is divided to say the least. The normative argument that parties represent 
the political will of citizens of the Union has remained unchallenged. The 
European parties lobby on a continuous base for a party statute that focuses 
more on the internal regulation of parties. However, these desires have not been 
matched by regulatory developments in the Union.  
The effect of European standards on national institutions 
As was mentioned above, the influence of European standards on national 
institutions can take on the form of norm absorption, norm accommodation, or 
norm adaptation. A first step in determining the influence of European standards 
comes in the form of determining the type of pressure that the European 
institutions can apply, i.e. coercive pressure or facilitated unilateralism. 
Facilitated unilateralism is present when the policy co-ordination between 
institutions is of a voluntary nature and when the institutions thus rely on 
persuasive instruments such as the institutionalization of objectives, guidelines, 
benchmarking and performance monitoring (Bulmer & Padgett, 2004). National 
preferences are highly influential in determining whether facilitated 
unilateralism succeeds in stimulating norm adaptation rather than norm 
absorption or accommodation. When national preferences diverge highly from 
international standards, the likelihood that these national standards will adapt to 
international ones decreases. The following sections discuss each European 
institution separately to (1) show that the type of pressure for change that it can 
apply falls under the category of facilitated unilateralism and (2) to determine 
whether this limited amount of pressure has been able to stimulate normative 
adaptation in national institutions, i.e. national party law and national political 
parties.  
European Court of Human Rights 
The ECtHR is a possible exception to the ‘rule’ of facilitated unilateralism because 
it is a supranational organ. It adjudicates disputes over alleged breaches of rights 
protected in the European Convention of Human Rights. Its judgments are 
binding under international law. From Article 46(1) of the Convention it follows 
that the Contracting Parties “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the 
Court in any case to which they are parties”. The Convention has very strong 
enforcement mechanisms and provides for both state and individual 
applications. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is 
composed of the government representatives of all member states, monitors the 
execution of Court judgments by the party involved (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 
2009; Keller & Stone Sweet, 2008). The Committee has developed the practice of 
keeping cases on its agenda until the Contracting Party concerned has taken all 
the necessary measures to abide by a judgment. However, due to the fact that the 
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Committee of Ministers is a political body, countries have been able to come 
away with delays or minimal compliance (Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, 2009). 
Non-compliance with ECtHR judgments has never occurred (Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, 2009), but if this were the case, a state would be found in breach of its 
obligation to the Convention scheme and could therefore be suspended from 
membership or forced to withdraw from the Council of Europe (Janis, Kay, et al., 
2008). The ECtHR thus applies substantial pressure on member states to take 
measures to solve situations that led to a breach of rights protected in the 
Convention. In theory, a state could be expelled from the Council of Europe due 
to non-compliance, but in practice the monitoring Committee of Ministers is too 
political to enforce the effective compliance of all states with ECtHR rulings.  
 The Court has treated 21 cases with regard to the violation of rights 
protected under Article 11 and political parties. The following section discusses 
the influence that ECtHR judgments had on individual parties and general party 
law in each of the countries ruled in violation of Article 11 regarding political 
parties in a chronological order.  
 
Normative influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
In the case of Vogt v. Germany (judgment of 26 September 1995) the Court ruled 
that the applicant’s dismissal as a disciplinary sanction for having refused to 
dissociate herself from the communist party (DKP) amounted to a 
disproportionate interference with the exercise of the freedom of association. 
The German Government transmitted the judgment to the Länder. An 
accompanying letter explained to the authorities that they would have to 
“examine all future cases of this kind in detail, in the light of the Court’s 
judgment” (van Dijk et al., 2006, p.309) to prevent similar violations. 
Between 1998 and 2005 the Court discussed 11 cases regarding the 
dissolution or the refusal to register political parties in Turkey. The Court only 
found a violation of Article 11 to be present in the case of the Refah Partisi and 
Others v. Turkey (judgment of 31 July 2001; judgment of 13 February 2003). On 
the individual level, the authorities removed all obstacles to the re-registration of 
the dissolved parties. As a general measure, the Turkish government amended 
the Constitution in 1995 and 2001 to bring it in line with the ECHR. This has 
lessened the consequences for members of dissolved parties and has introduced 
the requirement of proportionality. Other sanctions for political parties are now 
available and a party can no longer be sanctioned without evidence of anti-
democratic activities. Article 90 was amended in 2004 to elevate the status of 
international human rights treaties over that of national law in cases of conflict. 
The Law on Political Parties (LPP) was amended in 2003, reflecting the 
constitutional changes mentioned above. In addition, political parties are given a 
right of appeal against motions for dissolution. “In the light of these 
developments, the government now expects that all domestic courts, including 
the Constitutional Court, will give direct effect to the ECHR and the case-law of 
the ECtHR, not least when deciding matters relating to the dissolution of parties 
or the penalties to be imposed on their members” (Council of Europe, 2009: 
p.168). However, because of current developments in Turkey the question rises 
whether Turkey has indeed adapted its norm regarding the prohibition of the 
effective functioning of parties. The Constitutional Court dissolved the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) in response to accusations that it had become “a 
The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, working paper 04/10 
 35 
focal point of activities against the sovereignty of the state and the indivisible 
unity of the country and the nation” (Alpay, 2008). As its main argument for this 
decision, the Court relied on the allegation that the party was linked to the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (BBC, 2009). Interestingly enough, the PKK is 
one of the parties mentioned on the list annexed to the EU’s “Common position 
on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism”. The ECtHR used 
this same list to support its ruling that Spain had not violated Article 11 when it 
dissolved the Batasuna party. It would seem that Turkey has accommodated 
ECtHR standards in its national practice of banning pro-Kurdish parties. Or, to 
put it in the terminology of the previous chapter, Turkey’s approach is that of a 
‘militant democracy’, which is characterized by “an uncompromising struggle 
against the challengers” (Pedahzur, 2001: p.352). The standard promoted by the 
ECtHR clashes with and is unable to take precedence over this approach. In 
response to this clash, the Turkish state likely attempts to accommodate ECtHR 
norms within its legal practice rather than adapt its practices to these norms.  
Russia was found to have violated Article 11 when it refused to renew the 
registration of the Presidential Party of Mordovia in 1999 on the unlawful 
ground that it had not created branches in more than half the districts and cities 
of the region of Mordovia (Presidential Party of Mordovia v. Russia, judgment of 
5 October 2004). No individual measures could compensate for the damage 
caused, as regional political parties ceased to be recognized by law because of 
legislative changes in 2001. As a general measure, the Court’s judgment was 
published and disseminated to the regional authorities. Attention was drawn to 
the fact that any limitation of individual rights must be in accordance with 
domestic law (Council of Europe, 2009). 
In 1996 the Romanian authorities refused to register a political party 
based on its communist political program. Because the party never portrayed the 
desire to use unlawful and non-democratic means to achieve its aims, the Court 
ruled that Romania had violated Article 11 (Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) 
and Ungureanu v. Romania, judgment of 3 February 2005). In response to this 
judgment, the party was allowed to re-register. The Romanian courts made 
special conditions available for the party, thereby enabling it to fulfill the 
requirements imposed on parties by the new 2005 legislation on registration 
(Council of Europe, 2009). The ECHR and the Court’s case law have a direct effect 
in Romanian law. Because the interpretation of the law was the main problem in 
this case, the authorities published and disseminated the Court’s judgment and 
assured the Committee of Ministers that judicial practice has been put into 
conformity with the ECHR (Council of Europe, 2009). 
According to the ECtHR Bulgaria violated Article 11 in the case of the 
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – Pirin and Others v. Bulgaria (judgment 
of 20 October 2005) when it dissolved a political party that sought to achieve the 
recognition of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. The decision to dissolve it was 
based upon the notion that the organization’s separatist ideas were a threat to 
national security even though the applicants had never expressed any intention 
to use violence or other undemocratic means. Bulgaria took no effective 
individual measures to address this violation. The applicants have twice sought 
to re-register their dissolved party but their applications were rejected because 
of stricter membership requirements under a new law on political parties. With 
regard to general measures, it is important to note that ECtHR case law has 
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direct effect in Bulgarian law. The judgment of the ECtHR has thus been sent to 
the Constitutional Court and to the competent court for the registration of 
political parties. Several training activities have been organized for the judges of 
the Supreme Court of Cassation (Council of Europe, 2008). 
After the case of Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece (judgment of 20 
October 2005), in which Article 11 was violated when the national authorities 
did not live up to their positive obligation under the Convention to protect the 
rights that political parties enjoy under the freedom of association, “the police 
adopted a new anti-crime strategy taking into consideration, inter alia, the 
relevant Recommendations of the CM” (Council of Europe, 2008: p. 165). The 
Court’s judgment was disseminated among the relevant authorities and courts 
(Council of Europe, 2008). 
In 2002 the Moldovan Ministry of Justice imposed a ban on the activities 
of the Christian Democratic People’s Party because of its organization of 
unauthorized demonstrations against the introduction of the compulsory study 
of the Russian language in schools. The Court judged that Article 11 had been 
violated. The temporary ban on the party’s activities had already been lifted after 
enquiries of the Secretary General (Christian Democratic People’s Party v. 
Moldova, judgment of 14 February 2006). The Court’s judgment was translated, 
published and disseminated among the relevant authorities and courts (Council 
of Europe, 2008).  
In the case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden (judgment of 6 June 
2006) the Court ruled that Sweden had violated Article 11 when it stored 
information about the leaders and members of a political party on a secret police 
register. This information was subsequently removed from the records of the 
Swedish Security Service and the Court’s judgment was published and 
disseminated among the relevant authorities (Council of Europe, 2008). 
In the case of Linkov v. the Czech Republic (judgment of 7 December 2006) 
the Court ruled that the authorities of the Czech Republic violated Article 11 
when they refused to register a political party based on the fact that, according to 
its program, it aimed to break the legal continuity with totalitarian regimes. The 
party never portrayed the desire to use unlawful and non-democratic means 
towards this end. The Ministry of Internal Affairs assured the Committee of 
Ministers that the ground upon which the application was rejected would be 
considered as unlawful, were the applicant ever to try to register again (Council 
of Europe, 2008). 
The effect of the Court’s judgment has been most profound on the Turkish 
national legal system; the country involved in the majority of these cases. Turkey 
amended its Constitution and its law on political parties to bring both in line with 
ECHR norms. The principle of proportionality was incorporated in its legal 
system through the addition of less disruptive penalties for political parties. On 
the individual level, all parties were allowed to re-register. In line with Turkey, 
all other countries that were found to violate Article 11 undertook general 
measures where needed to prevent similar violations. Not all countries were as 
able or willing to undertake individual measures, however. As can be seen from 
the cases of Bulgaria and Russia, national practices or law can prevent the 
effective remedy of the damage inflicted by the violation of Article 11. Likewise, 
it is doubtful whether states will actually adapt their norms in light of ECtHR 
decisions. This is especially difficult in countries where the state repeatedly 
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prohibits the effective functioning of parties that represent an unrecognized 
minority (e.g. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) and where domestic standards will 
probably continue to take precedence over international ones.  
  
Council of Europe 
The pressure that the institutions within the Council of Europe can apply differs 
between the various bodies. However, all institutions use facilitated 
unilateralism to apply pressure, since the statutes of the CoE leave little room for 
binding agreements. The only CoE body that can create binding agreements is 
the Committee of Ministers in the form of conventions and agreements. 
Recommendations are not binding, although the Committee may inquire after 
the actions taken by member states to address them (Statute of the CoE, §15b). 
The Parliamentary Assembly is a consultative and deliberative organ that can 
present recommendations to the Committee of Minister (Chapter V of the Statute 
of the CoE, §22). The Council’s Commission for Democracy through Law, known 
as the Venice Commission prepares studies and draft guidelines and agreements. 
It may also supply opinions upon request of other international and national 
institutions (Statute of the Venice Commission, §3-4). A final CoE institution that 
applies pressure to change national political party legislation is the Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO). GRECO was established in 1999 to “improve 
the capacity of its members to fight corruption by following up, through a 
dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure, compliance through 
undertakings in this field” (Appendix to Resolution (99)5, §1). In cases of non-
compliance with recommendations made to countries in the country-specific 
evaluation reports, GRECO may request regular progress reports, invite the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe to send a letter to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, arrange a high-level mission, or bring the case before the 
Statutory Committee, which can issue a public statement regarding the member’s 
passive attitude towards taking action (Rules of Procedure, Rule 32).  
The CoE applies recommendations, guidelines, and opinions. Facilitated 
unilateralism is therefore the only means of pressure that can be applied to 
achieve the aims of these documents. The CoE appears to follow rather than lead 
the way for the ECtHR regarding the prohibition and dissolution of political 
parties. The ECtHR is the institution that applies pressure to influence national 
party law in the face of the prohibition and dissolution of political parties. The 
CoE only recently elaborated its Code of good practice for political parties so it is 
hard to imagine that is has been able to influence national party law on this issue. 
However, the CoE is very active in the field of influencing legislation on party 
funding. To determine the amount of influence that the CoE can exert over 
national institutions, the following section analyzes the work of GRECO. 
 
Normative influence of the Council of Europe 
GRECO’s aim is to enforce the national implementation of legislative, 
institutional, and practical reforms through the identification of deficiencies in 
national anti-corruption policies. 45 European States and the United States of 
America are currently members of GRECO (GRECO, 2009a). GRECO monitors 
progress through horizontal evaluation procedures in which all members are 
evaluated and assigned specific recommendations for reform. It also uses 
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compliance procedures in which an assessment is made of the members’ efforts 
to implement these recommendations. It is currently conducting its third 
evaluation round, which focuses on the criminalization of corruption and on the 
transparency of party funding (GRECO, 2009b). Evaluation reports have been 
elaborated on twenty countries. Unfortunately, compliance reports are not 
available yet. To determine the normative influence of the Council of Europe, an 
assessment is first made of compliance rates within the previous evaluation 
rounds. This is a reliable indicator for compliance with the recommendations 
made in round 3. Following the assessment, the remainder of this section 
provides an overview of the recommendations made regarding the transparency 
of party funding. 
 GRECO conducted its first evaluation round in the period 2000-2002. 
Focus of this round was on the “independence, specialization and means of 
national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against corruption. It also 
dealt with the extent and scope of immunities of public officials from arrest, 
prosecution, etc.” (GRECO, 2009b). Thirty-four countries took part in this round. 
The second evaluation round ran from 2003 to 2006 and addressed the 
“identification, seizure and confiscation of corruption proceeds, the prevention 
and detection of corruption in public administration and the prevention of legal 
persons (corporations, etc.) from being used as shields for corruption (GRECO, 
2009b). Forty-one countries participated in this round. Newcomers were obliged 
to also implement recommendations that had already been addressed in the first 
round. Luxembourg and Georgia were large defectors in the first round and 
Turkey and Bosnia Herzegovina in the second. 
 
Table 1: The implementation of GRECO recommendations 






Round 1 34 396 101 20 34 
Round 2 41 498 192 53 41 
Sources: GRECO evaluation rounds 1 and 2.  
 
The second part of evaluation round three, which focuses on the transparency of 
party funding, addresses the following aspects related to corruption and party 
funding on a country-specific base: general issues, thereby identifying recent 
controversies, the specific manifestation of political culture, system and 
regulatory practices within a country, and all sources of political financing; 
issues related to transparency, thereby identifying audit functions and 
challenges of ensuring full disclosure by parties; issues related to supervision, 
which focuses on all aspects related to the monitoring function of the state; and 
the issue of sanctions, which evaluates the effectiveness of prosecution and of the 
range of sanctions (GRECO, 2007). In total GRECO recommended 163 points to 
the twenty members that were evaluated.  
 Most of these recommendations entail adaptation of national party law 
for countries to be able to effectively implement them. As such, GRECO advises 
Albania to introduce secondary legislation to implement new provisions on 
election campaign funding and encourages Belgium to undertake a consultation 
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on the need for a comprehensive review of party financing and election 
campaigns law. GRECO furthermore recommends that Belgium amend its 
legislation so as to ensure that parties lose their obligations to all forms of public 
assistance in the case of party failure regarding funding requirements. Croatia 
needs to harmonize its various election laws and France is advised to lay down 
rules that aim to avoid affiliation of members of parliament out of financial 
considerations. Iceland, Poland, and Slovakia are required to introduce 
regulations that ensure transparency of the campaign finances in presidential 
elections. GRECO recommends that Luxembourg grants a legal status to political 
parties, since the absence of such a status causes political parties to resort to 
arrangements that discourage transparency in their financing. These are but a 
few examples of proposed legal changes. The majority of the recommendations 
have to do with party behavior. GRECO mentions in various reports that 
countries need to enforce party behavior such as the disclosure of donor identity, 
the provision of annual accounts with detailed information on income, 
expenditure, debts, and assets. In these accounts, parties should include entities, 
which are related directly or indirectly to the party, or are under its control. They 
should also provide detailed information on campaign finances. These 
documents should be made available to the public. Other recommendations 
address the issue of effective and independent monitoring, supervision and 
auditing. All countries are recommended to introduce more flexible and effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (GRECO evaluation round 3). 
 Based on the previous compliance reports a substantial amount of 
accommodation or absorption of new norms may be expected. GRECO 
specifically recommends changes in national party law to create an impetus for 
party change. Previous experiences in Montenegro, Georgia and Macedonia show 
that countries have been willing to amend national law because of GRECO 
recommendations. However, in Serbia recommended legislative instruments are 
currently pending adoption, showing that this is not necessarily the case. Once 
national practices are amended they come to proscribe and prescribe specific 
types of party behavior. That this can become a defining influence on political 
parties becomes clear from recommendations to Belgium, where parties could 
lose their obligations to all forms of public assistance in the case of party failure 
regarding funding requirements. 
 
International party aid 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide a useful overview of the pressure techniques 
that international organizations can apply to influence party disposition towards 
a preferable type of state behavior, policies or institutional structures. These 
techniques include: “(1) information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly 
generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the 
most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or 
stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; 
(3) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a 
situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; 
and (4) accountability politics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to their 
previously stated policies or principles” (p.16). All these techniques fall within 
the category of facilitated unilateralism.  
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Normative influence of international party aid 
In his analysis of party aid providers Thomas Carothers (2006) found that the 
output of party aid strategies does not necessarily lead to the desired outcome of 
party change. Foreign party aid has a limited effect on political parties due to 
problems embedded within the nature of parties and party leaders, the 
structural conditions within which parties operate, and the provision of aid itself. 
Assuming that party aid provides apply an effective strategy that manages to put 
normative pressure on the party from within, from below, or from the party 
system, these strategies are not necessarily conducive to party change. This is 
the case when the top op the party counters the pressure to change or when 
structural factors inhibit party change. Several reasons exist to expect the 
resistance of party leaders. First of all, party leader personality may come into 
play. According to Carothers (p.177) “[a] certain kind of personality type usually 
ends up at the top of parties, a type not generally characterized by humility, 
flexibility, or a willingness to listen to and incorporate the ideas of others”. 
Secondly, party leaders often vigorously defend their hold on power and 
therefore refuse to cooperate with schemes that might eat away at their internal 
control of the party. Thirdly, party leaders do not necessarily share the vision of 
party aid providers regarding the higher party goal of upholding democracy. 
Instead, leaders may view parties as a means to gain access to office. Party 
leaders may thus possess little incentives to cooperate with party aid providers. 
Next to these elements related to party leaders, structural factors that inhibit 
party change are often present in developing countries. These structural factors 
consist of the presence of a weak rule of law; poverty; constraints on policy 
choices; antipolitical legacies; and presidential systems. (Carothers, 2006) 
 In 2007 international NGO ‘Democracy International’ was contracted by 
USAID to conduct a study of its political party development aid in Eastern Europe 
and Eurasia. The findings of this study largely reflect the problems associated 
with party aid already identified by Carothers. Democracy International thus 
advises USAID to take into account “structural and environmental constraints” 
and the “incentives of politicians and political parties” that can be applied to 
entice them to implement reforms (p.51). Efforts to reform the party system and 
the legal party framework were found to be most effective in countries where 
sudden opportunities for change appeared in the political context.  
 Generally speaking, party aid programs have not been found to lead to a 
direct change in party behavior. Instead, party aid providers are advised to build 
a solid but flexible presence in developing countries to continue to confront 
parties with European norms on what parties and party legislation should look 
like and to take advantage of the political openings for change whenever they 
present themselves (Carothers, 2006; Democracy International, 2007). Because 
the success of party aid providers is depended on the incentives present within 
parties and party system to implement reforms, it is highly unlikely that they are 
able to create enough pressure for national normative adaptation.  




As was shown above, the European Union is a special case because the 
development of party legislation within the European Union does not directly 
influence national party legislation. Instead developments within the European 
Union reflect national and European developments regarding the creation of a 
common norm on party law. However, during the latest rounds of accession to 
the Union, the Europe Commission established legislation on party funding as 
one of the conditions for EU membership (Walecki, 2007). The following sections 
discuss how European developments regarding party legislation affected the 
European parties and describe how European conditionalities for membership 
have affected national legislation on party funding.  
 
Normative influence of the European Union 
The report of the Court of Auditors and the subsequent introduction of 
Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 had several consequences for political parties at the 
European level. First of all, the financial connections between the political groups 
in the European Parliament and their transnational party federations needed to 
be severed, as the Court of Auditors had ruled on the illegality of these 
connections. The Europarties were forced to find new office-space and new staff, 
rather than borrow them from their political groups, which led to a 
professionalization of the parties and a clearer separation of the function of the 
party and of its political groups. Organizational change and ideological 
compromise were especially necessary for the European Green party, which had 
previously managed its affairs based on the principles of decentralization and 
internal democracy, and for the European Free Alliance (EFA), which consisted 
of members with a focus on the sub-national rather than the European level 
(Lightfoot, 2006). Several parliamentary groups unsuccessfully challenged the 
new regulation in the European Court of Justice, based on the argument that “it is 
discriminatory to smaller forces not represented in existing Europarties or to 
parties that opposed European integration” (Johansson & Raunio, 2005: p.527). 
The court deemed these accusations inadmissible on the grounds that the 
individual freedom of thought, expression and association had not been directly 
violated (Schönlau, 2006). As a result these groups united themselves in two 
Eurosceptic parties, thereby expanding the number of recognized Europarties to 
ten (Lightfoot, 2006). Both developments substantiate the argument that the 
creation of European political parties has had the consequence that the 
previously relatively free party federations are now subject to increasing 
regulations.  
 In his study on the influence of European conditionality and party 
financing legislation, Walecki (2007) shows how the process of accession to the 
European Union produced pressure on the candidate countries to change or add 
legislation regarding party financing regulations. The amount of pressure 
applied for change varied between the countries. In the cases of Bulgaria and 
Romania, the European Union actively proscribed and monitored the desired 
changes in this field, whereas the pressure on other countries was less 
consistent. All countries but Hungary changed or added legislation on party 
funding as a result (see Appendix 5). 
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Whether these changes in legislation will actually succeed in regulating 
party behavior with regard to financing remains to be seen, however. “The 
problem with adding restrictions in CEE countries is that in general they don’t 
address the underlying fragility of parties, their weak institutionalization, the 
lack of popular funding, and the decrease in public confidence which they enjoy” 
(Walecki, 2007: p.17). A second problem related to these changes in party 
financing legislation is that the measures are not necessarily matched by 
institutional changes that improve implementation of the law. This implies that 
normative absorption or accommodation, rather than normative adaption, is 
taking place in these countries.  
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the European institutions that aim to change political 
party behavior and political party legislation all apply a strong normative and 
regulatory standard in the process. The content of their standards does vary, 
however, as do the thematic dimensions that they apply standards to. First of all, 
the institutions address different types of ills through the proposed changes in 
party law and party behavior. The ECtHR and the CoE prescribe and proscribe 
similar types of party behavior to promote the higher goal of protecting 
democracy against party decay caused by the loss of public confidence and 
against extremist parties. The European Parliament and the party aid providers 
prescribe and proscribe party behavior to create democracy through responsible 
party development. Party regulations are thus applied as a solution to a 
multitude of problems. As a consequence of these normative differences, the 
institutions also differ in the regulatory elements that they propose.  
The ECtHR values parties because of their important role in a democratic 
society and because they ensure pluralism. It therefore adopts a permissive 
regulatory stance towards the effective functioning of parties and requires that 
states protect party rights. States may only interfere with the effective 
functioning of parties when they show an inclination to the use of violent means 
to achieve their goals or when they propose principles that run counter to 
fundamental democratic ones. Because of the Islamic and terrorist threats to 
democracy present in the Refah Partisi v. Turkey and the Herri Batasuna and 
Batasuna v. Spain Cases its standard changed from one that is commonly found in 
‘immunized democracies’, or strongly liberal democracies that are generally 
opposed to judicial measures against political parties to one commonly found in 
‘defending democracies’, or liberal democracies that change the boundaries of 
the ‘rule of law’ in response to a serious threat. Parties that advocate principles 
of legal and political pluralism or terrorism pose a threat to democracy, thereby 
creating a ‘pressing social need’ that allows for an interference with their 
functioning. The Court does not take its regulatory power so far as to include 
issues related to party funding.  
 The standard regarding political parties and party legislation applied by 
the CoE has changed over the years, as have the thematic dimensions it 
addresses. The CoE’s main normative point of view is that parties play an 
essential role within democracy. In the eyes of the CoE, this role is endangered 
by the rise of extremist parties, by corruption scandals, and by the subsequent 
loss of public confidence in parties. In light of the threat of extremist parties the 
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CoE has changed its regulatory focus from permitting the effective functioning of 
parties towards becoming more inhibitive. Again, a shift is present from an 
approach of ‘immunized democracies’ to that of ‘defending democracies’. In light 
of the threat that party behavior leads to a loss of public trust, the bodies of the 
CoE have turned towards prescribing some behavior related to party funding 
and even more behavior related to internal party organization and political 
functions.   
Party aid providers aim to address the ill of problematic democratic 
development, which is the consequence of the malfunctioning of political parties. 
In order to fight this ill, they promote multi-party systems that are not polarized 
or fragmented and that offer a real choice to the voters. They furthermore 
promote political party behavior that is inclusive, representative, transparent, 
accountable, and institutionalized. This regulatory outlook and the preference 
for smaller party-systems without parties that hold an extreme ideology makes 
that party aid providers are less concerned with the effective functioning of 
parties than organizations that highly value the maintenance of democratic 
pluralism. 
The standard of the European Union seems to have been largely created 
by the transnational party federations. It has subsequently been upheld by the 
European Parliament and the European parties. The normative element holds 
that parties represent the political will of citizens of the Union. The regulatory 
element consists of a constant pressure for the creation of a party statute to 
create stronger parties towards the end of democratic development within the 
Union. The parties have succeeded in getting the Union to recognize that 
European parties exist and that they need to receive funding in order to 
effectively represent the European citizens. Further attempts at creating 
legislation related to political parties on issues such as internal organization or 
the creation of an individual membership base have not been successful. This 
suggests that other forces within the European Union do not share the view that 
more European party legislation is needed. Whether disagreement over the 
normative assumption that parties need to be strengthened to improve their role 
of expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union is the cause of this 
regulatory lethargy is not clear.   
 When confronted by the standards of the European institutions, the 
national institutions clearly incorporate the new norms in their domestic 
structures, i.e. national party law. The ECtHR’s judgments have all led to 
countries taking general measures to prevent similar violations. Likewise, 
previous rounds of GRECO evaluations show that most countries are willing to 
adjust national law to implement GRECO recommendations. However, whether 
national authorities replace institutions by new, substantially different ones, 
depends on the embedded national preferences. Within the European Union, the 
transnational party federations’ efforts led to the creation of a party statute. In a 
similar vein, GRECO’s recommendations can become of a defining influence on 
national political parties when countries implement recommendations such as 
the one given to Belgium, where parties could lose their obligations to all forms 
of public assistance in the case of party failure regarding funding requirements. 
EU conditions for accession led to additions or changes of party financing 
regulation in all candidate countries except Hungary.  
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However, in some of the ECtHR cases individual measures are not 
implemented when national practices or law can prevent the effective remedy of 
the damage inflicted by the violation of Article 11. Likewise, not all GRECO 
member states have been able to effectively implement recommendations. Of all 
the European institutions targeting parties and party legislation, the party aid 
providers’ work is an example of the most voluntary type of cooperation. In 
order for their work to be effective, they need to take into account the local 
context and constraints, they need to offer incentives to induce parties and 
governments to implement reforms, and they need to be flexible in order to be 
able to take advantage of openings for change whenever they present 
themselves. Party aid providers are thus most dependent on favorable domestic 
preferences for action.  
This paper thus suggests that although European standards often matter 
for national party regulation, the extent to which they matter and thus affect 
national political party legislation and the parties themselves largely depends on 
the standard’s conformity with embedded national preferences.  Some problems 
are present within this argument. The difficulty in establishing the successful 
influence of the European institutions forms a first problem. In the end, all 
institutions aim to create a change within parties, be it by targeting national 
party legislation or political parties themselves. This raises the question whether 
international standards are influential when they are able to instigate a change 
within national party legislation, or whether their rate of success depends on the 
subsequent ability of party law to effectively regulate parties and their behavior. 
In terms of the concepts used in this paper, it seems unlikely that the European 
institutions merely aim at the absorption or accommodation of norms into 
national party legislation. The fact that the Venice Commission’s Code of good 
practice does not address party legislation, but political parties themselves, 
underlines this point. However, in terms of Europeanization even the absorption 
or accommodation of norms would be indicative of an increasing level of 
European influence on the national policy making process.  
A related problem comes in the form of the influence of national 
preferences. Although this paper suggests that national preferences are 
influential in determining the amount of change that European standards can 
create on a national level, it does not take these national preferences into 
account in a systematic manner. Further research could perhaps apply a bottom 
up perspective to better capture the interplay between European standards and 
national preferences. The forthcoming GRECO compliance reports will likely 
provide a starting point for such an approach by offering clear indicators of the 
areas in which countries are or are not willing to change or add party (finance) 
regulations.  
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Appendix 1: European Court of Human Rights judgments of merits in Article 
11 cases involving political parties
7
 
Case and date of judgment Issue Violation of 
Article 11 
Vogt v. Germany  
(26/09/1995) 
Dismissal of teacher because of refusal to 
dissociate from the communist DKP 
Yes 
United Communist party v. Turkey 
(30/1/1998) 
Dissolution of the TBKP because of 
communist and Kurdish minority issues 
Yes 
Socialist party v. Turkey 
(25/05/1998) 
Dissolution of the SP because of socialist 
and Kurdish minority issues 
Yes 
Freedom & democracy party 
(ÖZDEP) v. Turkey (08/12/1999) 
Dissolution of the ÖZDEP because of 
Kurdish minority issues 
Yes 
Refah Partisi (Welfare party) v. 
Turkey (31/07/2001) 
Dissolution of Refah Partisi on grounds of  
Sharia & violent means 
No 
Yazar v. Tureky  
(09/04/2002) 
Dissolution of the HEP because of 
Kurdish minority issues 
Yes 
Dicle for the Democratic party v. 
Turkey (10/12/2002) 
Dissolution of the EP because of Kurdish 
minority issues 
Yes 
Refah Partisi (Welfare party) v. 
Turkey (13/02/2003) 
Dissolution of Refah Partisi on grounds of  
Sharia & violent means 
No 
Socialist party of Turkey (STP) v. 
Turkey (12/11/2003) 
Dissolution of STP because of Kurdish 
minority issues 
Yes 
Presidential party Mordovia v. 
Russia (05/10/2004) 
Refusal to renew registration of 
Mordovia party on territorial grounds  
Yes 
Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) 
v. Romania (03/02/2005) 
Refusal to register the PCN because of its 
communist political program 
Yes 
Democracy & change party v. Turkey 
(26/04/2005) 
Dissolution of DDP because of Kurdish 
minority issues 
Yes 
Emek Partisi & Senol v. Turkey 
(31/05/2005) 
Dissolution of the EP because of Kurdish 
minority issues 
Yes 
Guneri v. Turkey  
(12/07/2005) 
Members of the DBP were prohibited 
from holding a meeting – Kurdish issue 
Yes 
UMO Ilinden-Pirin v. Bulgaria 
(20/10/2005) 
Dissolution of the Macedonian minority 
party UMO Ilinden-PIRIN 
Yes 
Ouranio Toxo v. Greece 
(20/10/2005) 
Authorities stood aside during violent 
attack on Macedonian party headquarter 
Yes 
Christian Democratic People’s party 
v. Moldova (14/02/2006) 
Ban on party’s activities because of pro-
tests against Russian lessons in school 
Yes 
Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden 
(06/06/2006) 
Storage of information about party lea-
ders and members on secret register  
Yes 
Linkov v. Czech Republic 
(07/12/2006) 
Refusal to register the Liberal Party (PL) 
because of its stance on totalitarianism 
Yes 
Parti Nationaliste Basque v. France 
(07/06/2007) 
Rejection of approval for party funding 
association with foreign financial ties 
No 
Herri Batasuna & Batasuna v. Spain 
(30/06/2009) 
Dissolution of Herri Batasuna because of 
ties to terrorist organization ETA 
No 
                                                        
7All judgments available in HUDOC case law database at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en. This table only includes 
judgments of merits of cases involving political parties.  
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Appendix 2: European Court of Human Rights case law involving political 
parties 
 
Limited margin of appreciation  
1. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January, 
1998, §46. 
2. Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, §50 
3. Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey, judgment of 8 
December 1999, §44 
4. Yazar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 9 April 2002, §58 
5. Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 13 February 2003, §100 
6. Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 12 
November 2003, §44 
7. The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – Pirin and Others v. 
Bulgaria, judgment of 20 October 2005, §56 
8. Linkov v. The Czech Republic, judgment of 7 December 2006, §35 
9. Parti Nationaliste Basque – Organisation Régionale D’Iparralde v. France, 
judgment of 7 June 2007, §46 




The limits within which political groups may conduct their activities while enjoying 
the protection of the Convention’s provisions.  
11. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January, 
1998, §57. 
 Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, §45 
 Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey, judgment of 8 
December 1999, §44 
 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 31 July 2001, §46 
 Yazar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 9 April 2002, §48 
 Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP of Turkey v. Turkey, judgment of 10 
December 2002, §45 
 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 13 February 2003, §101 
 Guneri v. Turkey, judgment of 12 July 2005, §76 
 Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, judgment 
of 3 February 2005, §55 
 
 
The conditions under which a political party may campaign for political programs 
that challenge the basic ideology and constitutional structure of the state  
 Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, §46-47. 
 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 31 July 2001,  §47. 
 Yazar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 9 April 2002, §49  
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Necessary in a democratic society 
 Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, §49. 
 Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey, judgment of 8 
December, 1999, §43. 
 Refah Partisi (Prosperity Party and Others) v. Turkey, judgment of July 31, 
2001, §64. 
 Yazar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of April 9, 2002, §52. 
 Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, judgment of 
December 10, 2002, §48. 
 Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, judgment of February 
13, 2003, §104. 
 Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 
November 12, 2003, §39. 
 Democracy and Change Party and Others v Turkey, judgment of April 26, 
2005, §26. 
 Emek Partisi and Senol v Turkey, judgment of May 31, 2005, §29. 
 Guneri v Turkey, judgment of July 12, 2005, §80. 
 Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, 
judgment of October 2, 2001, §87. 
 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – Pirin and Others v 
Bulgaria, judgment of October 20, 2005, §62. 
 Linkov v The Czech Republic, December 7, 2006, §37. 
 Parti Nationaliste Basque – Organisation Régionale D’Iparralde v France, 
judgment of June 7, 2007, §52. 
 Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova, judgment of February 14, 
2006, §76. 
 Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski v the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, judgment of January 15, 2009, §66. 
 Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v Romania, judgment 
of February 3, 2005, §48. 
 Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v Spain, judgment of June 30, 2009, 83. 
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Appendix 3: Council of Europe documents regarding political parties 
Text Subject Year 
Political parties and the freedom of association 
VC Guidelines  Prohibition and dissolution of political parties 1999 
VC Guidelines and 
explanatory report  
Legislation on political parties: some specific issues 2004 
Extremist parties and movements 
PACE Recommendation 
1438 
Threat to democracy by extremist parties and 
movements in Europe 
2000 
PACE Resolution 1308 Restrictions on political parties in the Council of 
Europe member states 
2002 
PACE Resolution 1344 Threat posed to democracy by extremist parties and 
movements in Europe 
2003 
Political party financing 
VC Guidelines and report  Financing of political parties 2001 
PACE Recommendation 
1516 
Financing of political parties 2001 
CM Recommendation 
2003(4) 
Common rules against corruption in the funding of 
political parties and electoral campaigns 
2003 
VC Opinion The prohibition of financial contributions to political 
parties from foreign sources 
2006 
Good practice 





New concepts to evaluate the state of democratic 
development 
2004 
PACE Resolution 1546 Code of good practice for political parties 2007 
VC Code of good practice  Political parties 2008 
 
VC = Venice Commission 
PACE = Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
CM = Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
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Appendix 4: Europe Union documents regarding political parties 
Text Subject Body Year 
Maastricht Treaty First mention of parties EU Council 1992 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
Freedom of assembly and of association: 





Nice Treaty Party funding EU Council 2000 
Regulation  
(EC 2004/2003) 
Legal regulation party funding Co-decision 2003 
Regulation 1605/2002 Financial regulation party funding 
(grants) 
EU Council 2002 
Regulation 2003/2205 
(REG) 





Procedural regulation party funding EU Bureau 2004 
Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
Amendment of first paragraph party 
article + split of article  
EU Council 2004 
Resolution 2005/2224 
(INI) 
Proposal to amend legal regulation 
party funding  
+  











Amendment financial regulation party 
funding 
EU Council 2007 
Feasibility Study Party statute AFCO 2007 
Treaty of Lisbon Replication of amendments in European 
Constitution + Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
EU Council 2009 
 
AFCO = Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
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Appendix 5: EU Recommendations and party financing regulation 
Country EU Documents Legislation Changed/Added Accession 
Slovakia EC Regular Report The 2005 Act on Financing of 
Political Parties and Electoral 
Campaigns replaced the original 
1991 Act 
2004 
Poland European Parliament 
Resolution and EC 
Regular Report 
The Law on Political Parties – 
amended in 2001-2005 
2004 
Latvia European Parliament 
Resolution 
The Law on Financing of 
Political Organisations (Parties) 
– amended in 2002-2005 
2004 
Lithuania European Parliament 
Resolution 
The 2004 Law on Financing and 
Financial Control of Political 
Parties and Political Campaigns 
2004 
Hungary European Parliament 




Bulgaria EC Regular Reports The 2005 Law on Political 
Parties 
2007 
Romania EC Regular Reports The 2006 Law on Financing of 
Political Parties and Electoral 
Campaigns 
2007 
Croatia EC Regular Reports The 2004 Act on Financing the 
Presidential Elections Campaign 
and the 2006 Bill on Financing 









EC Regular Report The 2003 Law on Financing of 
Political Parties 
Candidate 
Turkey EC Regular Reports The Law amended in 2005 Candidate 
Source: Walecki (2007) 




Council of Europe 
“CM Recommendation 2003(4)” [Online]. Available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2183&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackCo
lorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“GRECO First Evaluation Round (2000-2002)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports(rou
nd1)_en.asp [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“GRECO Second Evaluation Round (2003-2006)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports(rou
nd2)_en.asp [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“GRECO Third Evaluation Round (launched in 2007)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/ReportsRou
nd3_en.asp [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Recommendation 1438(2000)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/EREC1
438.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Resolution1308(2002)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1
308.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Resolution 1344(2003)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1
344.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Recommendation 1516(2003)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/EREC1
516.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Resolution 1407(2004)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Ado
ptedText/ta04/ERES1407.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Recommendation 1680(2004)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Ado
ptedText/ta04/EREC1680.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“PACE Resolution 1546(2007)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES1
546.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
Venice Commission (1999). “Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of 
Political Parties and Analogous Measures”. Guidelines adopted by the Venice 
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Commission at its 41st plenary session. Venice, 10-11 December 1999. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2000/CDL-INF(2000)001-e.asp 
[Accessed 24 December 2009]. 
Venice Commission (2001). “Guidelines and Report on the Financing of Political 
Parties.” Guidelines adopted by the Venice Commission at its 46st plenary 
session. Venice, 09-11 March 2001. [Online].  
Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)008-e.asp 
[Accessed 24 December 2009]. 
Venice Commission (2004). “Guidelines and Explanatory Report on Legislation 
on Political Parties: Some Specific Issues.” Guidelines adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 58th plenary session. Venice, 12-13 March 2004. [Online].  
Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)007rev-e.asp 
[Accessed 24 December 2009]. 
Venice Commission (2006) “Opinion on the Prohibition of Financial 
Contributions to Political Parties from Foreign Sources.” Opinion adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 66th plenary session. Venice, 17-18 March 2006. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-
AD(2006)014-e.asp [Accessed 24 December 2009].  
Venice Commission (2008) “Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political 
Parties.” Code adopted by the Venice Commission at its 77th plenary session. 
Venice, 12-13 December 2008. [Online]. Available at: 




“Common Position on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism” 
(2005) [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.
pdf [Accessed 21 January 2010]. 
“Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML [Accessed 21 
January 2010]. 
“Decision 2004/C 155/01” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004D0612%2801%29:E
N:HTML [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf [Accessed 21 January 
2010]. 
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“European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.ecln.net/documents/lisbon/charta_en_2007.pdf [Accessed 21 
January 2010]. 
“Lisbon Treaty” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML [Accessed 21 
January 2010]. 
“Maastrich Treaty” [Online]. Availabe at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html [Accessed 18 
January 2010]. 
“Nice Treaty” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf [Accessed 18 
January 2010]. 
 “Regulation (EC) 2004/2003” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/PH1850.htm [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“Regulation 1605/2002” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002Q1605:EN:HTML 
[Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“Regulation 2003/2205 (REG)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refer
ence=P5-TA-2004-0144 [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
 “Resolution 2005/224 (INI)” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refer
ence=P6-TA-2006-0114 [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“Regulation (EC) 1524/2007” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:343:0005:0008:EN:PDF 
[Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
“Regulation (EC) 1525/2007” [Online]. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:343:0009:0010:EN:PDF 
[Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
“The European Court of Human Rights HUDOC portal” [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ [Accessed 18 January 2010]. 
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